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ABSTRACT
Laird, Brian K., Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2014. To Trust Or Not: The
Effects of Monitoring Intensity on Discretionary Effort, Honesty, and Problem Solving
Ability. Major Professor: Charles D. Bailey
Managerial accounting researchers and practitioners are increasingly concerned
with the effects of formal organizational controls on agent behavior. This three-paper
dissertation extends this line of research by experimentally examining the effects of
monitoring intensity on three important work behaviors which, generally, are not directly
observable by the organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving
ability, and honesty. Together, these studies help fill a gap in the managerial accounting
literature by examining the relationship between the monitoring environment and agent
behavior.
The principal-agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the
principal will increase the agent’s work effort at best, and have no effect at worst.
However, the psychology literature suggests that monitoring may actually reduce effort
by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform unmeasured or
unrewarded work related tasks. In Paper 1, I test for the crowding out effect of
monitoring and find mixed results.
In Paper 2, I investigate the effects of monitoring intensity on various aspects of
problem solving ability and creativity. Past research suggests that strict environmental
controls can have detrimental effects on creative thinking. I extend this line of literature
by investigating how monitoring affects an individual’s problem solving ability. In
general, I find that monitoring intensity is negatively associated with problem solving
ability.

iii

In Paper 3, I investigate how monitoring intensity affects an individual’s
propensity toward dishonesty using a 3x2 experimental design where the participants are
given a simple task, with a monetary reward based on performance, in one of the three
monitoring treatments—trust, human monitoring, or electronic monitoring—and in one
of two outcome reporting regimes—self-report or verified. I find an inverted-U shape
relationship between monitoring intensity and dishonesty, where dishonesty is highest
under human monitoring.
Organizations are increasing their use of all types of surveillance and controls,
and, in general, trust is increasingly discouraged within organizations. These papers add
to the managerial accounting literature by shedding light on how different monitoring
environments can change human behavior. This line of research can only increase in
importance as regulation increases and monitoring technology becomes more advanced,
reliable, and accessible.
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PREFACE
This three-paper dissertation experimentally examines the effects of monitoring
intensity on three important work behaviors which are, generally, unobservable by the
organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving, and honesty. The
three studies are written as independent chapters for potential publication, each of which
has been submitted to the American Accounting Association’s Annual Meeting and other
academic conferences. As a result there may be repetition of some information in the
studies.
The three experiments that comprise this dissertation were done in one sitting for
each participant. Twelve sessions were held in a computer lab at a large public university.
Each session contained either 9 or 10 participants. A total of 114 individuals participated,
earning an average of $15.15. The total payout to participants was $1,728.
At the end of this dissertation there is a general conclusion. The general
conclusion ties the three studies together and discusses the implications of the dissertation
as a whole. The implications of each study also are discussed in a conclusion section at
the end of each study.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This three-paper dissertation experimentally examines the effects of monitoring
intensity on three important work behaviors which, generally, are not directly observable
by the organizational control system: discretionary effort, problem solving, and honesty.
The basis of this research is that most individuals, by default, are internally motivated to
exert effort in order to perform a fair exchange, be honest, and utilize complex problem
solving skills. However, control mechanisms can crowd out the internal motivation to be
fair and honest by lowering the individual’s propensity toward reciprocity (

chter and

Falk 2002) or by lowering the individual’s threshold for dishonesty.1 Additionally,
controls may increase work-related stress which can negatively influence problem
solving skills (e.g., Hennesey and Amabile 1998; Elsbach and Hargadon 2006). These
effects may be more pronounced when the control system is perceived by the agent as
being intrusive, overly controlling, or unnecessary (Stanton 2000).
Often the terms monitoring and control are used interchangeably in the business
literature. However, most formal definitions of the two terms view monitoring as one part
of the control system. Tosi et al. (1997, 588) defined monitoring as “observation of an
agent’s effort or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision, accounting controls,
and other devices.” Monitoring, alone, is void of any rewards, punishments, or corrective
actions. Koontz and O'Donnell (1955, 103), in the classic book Principles of
Management, describe control as “the measurement and correction of performance in
order to make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised to attain them are

1

Research has shown that individuals’ preference for honesty often depends on environmental
factors (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Belot and Schröder 2013).
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accomplished.” Through monitoring, effort and/or outcomes are observed and measured.
Monitoring becomes part of the organizational control system when these observations
and measurements are used to influence future performance. Thus, the control system can
be broken up into two parts, monitoring (measurement or observation) and control
(corrective actions, rewards, threats, compensation scheme, etc.), and each part can be
studied separately. In these studies, I consider the effects of monitoring intensity on
certain aspects of behavior while holding the other parts of the control system constant.
The three experiments that comprise this dissertation were done in one sitting for
each participant. Twelve sessions were held in a computer lab at a large public university.
Each session contained either 9 or 10 participants, with a total of 114 individuals
participating. Each session was pre-assigned one of three monitoring treatments, trust
monitoring (low), human monitoring (medium), or electronic monitoring (high), and
separately, one of two reporting treatments, self-report or verified, for the Task 3. Each
participant was assigned to one treatment group and performed three tasks, with each task
representing a new experiment.
My first study looks at the effects on monitoring intensity on discretionary effort.
The principal-agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the principal
will increase the agent’s work effort at best, and have no effect at worst. However,
standard principal-agent theory doesn’t consider the effects of monitoring on agent work
behaviors that falls outside of the control system, such as discretionary effort or voluntary
effort. The psychology literature suggests that monitoring may actually reduce such effort
by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform unmeasured or
unrewarded work. Accordingly, I hypothesize that as monitoring increases across groups,
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discretionary effort and voluntary effort will decrease. The details of the study, results,
and implications are discussed in Chapter 2.
In the second study I investigate the effects of monitoring intensity on various
aspects of problem solving ability and creativity. Past research suggests that strict
environmental controls can have detrimental effects on creative thinking, which is critical
for finding the optimal solution to complex problems. I test this proposition and I extend
this line of literature by investigating how monitoring affects an individual’s ability to
establish and use a pattern solution, recognize when a pattern solution is no longer
efficient, and solve complex problems. The details of the study, results, and implications
are discussed in Chapter 3.
In the third study I investigate how monitoring intensity affects an individual’s
propensity toward behavioral dishonesty. This variable is operationalized by splitting
each monitoring treatment in to two subgroups. Each group is given the same simple
puzzle, with monetary compensation tied to performance. One group self-reported their
performance, while the other group had their performance checked.2 Past research has
shown that individuals are very prone to reciprocal behavior, with such behavior
extending into the principal-agent context. I hypothesize that as monitoring increases
across groups, dishonesty will also increase. The details of the study, results, and
implications are discussed in Chapter 4.
Organizations are increasing their use of all types of surveillance and controls,
and, in general, trust is increasingly discouraged within organizations. These papers add
to the managerial accounting literature by shedding light on how individuals react to

2

This research design, which test honesty, is similar to the research design used in Ariely et al.

(2009).
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various levels of monitoring and extend a larger body of research that is concerned with
the effects of formal controls on behavior within organizations (e.g., Christ et al. 2012).
Specifically, this research is concerned with the potential “hidden costs of monitoring”
which may arise during the organizational control process. This line of research can only
increase in importance as regulation increases and monitoring technology becomes more,
advanced, reliable, and accessible.
Because of the complexity of the individual psyche and the vast number of
uncontrollable factors in organizational settings, investigations into the effects of
monitoring on individual behavior are well-suited for laboratory experiments. The results
of these experiments are not meant to be directly generalizable outside of a laboratory
setting. Rather, these experiments, and their results, should be considered in the larger
frameworks of organizational theory, human psychology, and current practices.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING INTENSITY ON DISCRETIONARY TASK
EFFORT, VOLUNTEER RATES FOR OPTIONAL TASKS,
AND EFFORT ON OPTIONAL TASKS
INTRODUCTION
The Principal-Agent theory of the firm suggests that tighter monitoring by the
principal will increase the agent’s work effort (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) at best, and
have no effect at worst. In contrast, the psychology literature suggests that monitoring
may actually reduce effort by “crowding out” an individual’s intrinsic motivation to
perform a task (Frey 199 ) or to be “fair” to the principal (

chter and alk 2

2). The

agency theory and the “crowding out” literature are not necessarily contradictory if one
considers that most principal-agent relationships involve some effort that is monitored by
the principal, and some effort that cannot be, or is not, monitored (Hölmstrom 1979;
Bernheim and Whinston 1998; Hecht et al. 2012). Building on these ideas, I attempt to
reconcile the agency theory literature and the human motivation literature by
distinguishing between the monitored aspects of a task, in which external controls may
substitute for internal motivation, and the less monitored discretionary and optional
aspects of a task, in which external controls may not substitute for internal motivation. I
hypothesize that increasing task-monitoring (external control) will increase effort on the
monitored aspects of a task at the expense of discretionary or voluntary aspects of the
task. Accordingly, this paper fills a gap in the managerial literature by experimentally
examining the relationship between task-monitoring intensity and three different work
behaviors generally associated with internal motivation: discretionary effort on a
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mandatory task, volunteer rates for a work-related optional task, and effort exerted on the
optional task.
I used a laboratory experiment where the participants, 114 in total, were assigned
to one of three different monitoring treatment groups, electronic monitoring, human
monitoring, or trust (no monitoring). They were then asked to perform the clerical task of
cross-checking paper invoices with error-riddled transcriptions of the data, which had
been pre-entered into a spreadsheet. Each treatment group performed the clerical task for
a flat wage. The only task instruction for the participants was that they must correct
records for the entire work period to receive the flat wage. No direct instructions
pertaining to work quality or work quantity were given, leaving both to the discretion of
the worker. However, quantity was more observable by the monitoring than quality,
making quality more discretionary. After the task, and during a short free-time break, the
participants were solicited for optional feedback. On the clerical task, work task quantity
and work task quality (representing discretionary effort) were measured, while on the
optional feedback task, volunteer rates for the optional task and task completion rates
(representing effort spent on the optional task) were measured.
As discussed by Frey (1993), it is possible that, under certain conditions,
increasing monitoring may actually reduce agent effort by simultaneously lowering the
marginal cost of shirking and increasing the marginal cost of effort to the agent. Such
conditions abound when the monitoring is imperfect, providing an opportunity to
decrease effort, and the agent is psychologically affected by the monitoring or the change
in relationship with the principal, prompting a decrease in motivation. In this research, I
hypothesize that the more monitored an individual feels, the less obligated, and less
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motivated, the individual will feel to perform tasks that are not directly monitored or
measured by the control system, as compared to individuals who do not feel intensely
monitored. I find evidence to support this hypothesis when examining monitoring
intensity and discretionary effort (work quality) on a mandatory task. In this experiment,
work quality was higher when monitoring intensity was low. However, I find a more
complex relationship between monitoring intensity and optional tasks. Contrary to my
hypothesis, I find evidence, through higher volunteer rates, that monitoring intensity is
positively associated with the propensity to work on tasks that are presented as optional.
However, I also find that monitoring intensity is negatively related to effort spent on the
“optional” task once an individual volunteers to do it. This paradox likely manifests
because individuals, having been monitored in the previous task, still feel controlled. This
feeling of being controlled compels them to volunteer for the optional task, but they have
less internal motivation to sustain effort toward, or complete, the optional task.
Most work-related tasks are not intrinsically motivated, but are to some degree
externally motivated. Activities that are not intrinsically motivating require extrinsic
motivation, so their initial enactment depends upon the perception of a contingency
between the behavior and a desired consequence. However, when certain conditions are
met, individuals will adopt the actions, or goals, that were initially externally motivated
as part of their autonomous behavior so that the external contingency is no longer needed
to invoke the performance. Self-determination theory (Gagné and Deci 2005) postulates
that the more an individual feels controlled, the less likely they are to internalize external
regulations, values, and rules. This theory could account for monitoring intensity being
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positively related to volunteer rates on “optional” tasks, yet negatively related to
performance on the “optional” tasks.
This paper adds to the prior literature by showing evidence that employee
monitoring, as an organizational control mechanism, has negative effects on internal
motivation as compared to trust and reciprocity. However, the effects of lower internal
motivation are not readily visible on the monitored aspects of tasks, but are more likely to
manifest around the less monitored aspects of the task or the parts of the task which are
perceived by the agent as being optional. These findings suggest that when the principalagent relationship involves a complex job design, it may be more beneficial for the
principal to rely on trust and reciprocity instead of control, especially if the principal can
only monitor, or measure, part of the agent’s overall job or output.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides more theory
and background, Section III develops the hypotheses, Section IV describes the research
design, Section V provides the analysis of the results, and Section VI discusses
extensions, limitations, implications, and conclusions of the study.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND
Monitoring and Agency theory
In accounting and finance-related research, agency theory dominates the
discussion of organization control and management. Lambert (2001, 3) states that
“agency theory has been one of the most important theoretical paradigms in accounting
during the last 20 years. The primary feature of agency theory that has made it attractive
to accounting researchers is that it allows us to explicitly incorporate conflicts of interest,
incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems into our models.”
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In the standard agency theory model, income earned provides benefits while the effort
spent to earn it is a disutility. Further, agents will always exploit opportunities to lower
their effort absent a penalty for doing so. The introduction of more monitoring cannot
lower effort since agents are naturally effort averse (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) and are,
presumably, already maximizing income and minimizing effort, on average, at any given
point in time.
Despite its successes, agency theory has been criticized for the diminished realism
of adhering strictly to narrow self-interest and ignoring nonmonetary preferences such as
ethics, trust, and fairness (Arrow 1985). Many modern corporate contracts, control
systems, and governance structures are designed and based on the principles of agency
theory. This reality essentially means that many of the corporate “best practices”
accepted today do not emphasize important psychological components. Arce (2007)
examined how the assumptions of agency theory may be self-activating. He did so by
exploring a principal-agent framework that allows for the possibility that rational agents
may hold intrinsic preferences for autonomy in decision making and experience disutility
from being monitored. His analysis identified conditions under which the economic
approach to agency, which is principally framed in terms of monetary rewards and the
avoidance of effort, can select against agents' intrinsic preferences for autonomy and
break implicit contracts between principal and agent that are based on trust. In short, if
controls are built purely on economic rationality, then that is the type of behavior they
will cultivate. For example, agency-theory-based contracts have been accused of
encouraging opportunistic behavior (Ferraro et al. 2005) and blamed for the deteriorating
moral climate that has given rise to Enron and other corporate scandals (Kulik 2005).
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This experiment builds upon a long and interesting line of research that attempts
to add a human psychological component to the standard agency theory assumptions. I
test the standard agency theory assumption that monitoring cannot decrease effort, by
examining how monitoring affects performance on the aspects of tasks that the agent may
consider discretionary or voluntary. The goal of this line of research is to add descriptive,
prescriptive, and pedagogical usefulness to the principal-agent model (Stevens and
Thevaranjan 2010).
Monitoring and Effort
In a widely cited discussion article, Frey (1993) asked the rhetorical question
“does monitoring always increase effort?” rey’s main concern was the triangular
connection of monitoring, trust, and effort in the principal-agent relationship. He
concluded that the effects of monitoring on effort depend on whether the agent perceives
the monitoring to be a signal of distrust, which is more likely to be the case when the
agent and principal have an inter-personal relationship. When a psychological contract
exists between the agent and principal, an increase in, or focus on, monitoring may be
seen as violation of the mutual trust that has been established in the relationship. With
their previous psychological bond broken, the agent now has a lower marginal benefit
from working and higher marginal benefit from shirking. Shirking is now more likely,
assuming that the agent has the opportunity.
Dickinson and Villeval (2

8) tested rey’s (1993) theory in a laboratory setting.

They were interested in how anonymous versus interpersonal auditing would affect
effort. Their treatments were applied by having a portion of the participants meet with the
individual serving as their monitor and sit by their monitor during the experiment, while

10

the other participants never met or saw their monitor. The task involved using a computer
to move electronically along a line for a performance contingent wage. Each move cost
the operator monetarily (a proxy for effort), and, the monitor’s payoff depended on the
operator’s performance. If the operator was audited and underperformed, a fine was
incurred by the operator and retained by the monitor. They find that most agents react to
high levels of monitoring by increasing performance. However, they find that above a
certain threshold, monitoring decreases effort, and this effect is most pronounced in the
interpersonal treatment. The current research design differs from Dickinson and Villeval
(2008) because I set out to capture changes in discretionary effort and volunteer rates for
optional tasks, and I am using actual work effort instead of a proxy.
In another interesting study, Callahan and Larson (1990) tested whether
performance monitoring can influence work behavior in the absence of any subsequent
managerial action or feedback. They postulated that monitoring activity alone can serve
as cue, signaling the relative importance of one task over another. In their experiment,
they gave each participant two tasks, which they were to work on concurrently for two
hours. In the control group, the participants were left alone for two hours. In the treatment
group, the experimenter would come in every 20 minutes and check the progress of one
of the tasks only, offering no feedback. Despite being instructed to work diligently on
both tasks, the treated participants outperformed on the monitored task while
performance on the non-monitored task fell in proportion. The net effect of monitoring,
when total production on both tasks was considered, was small as compared to a control
group who worked on both tasks without any monitoring.
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Falk and Kosfeld (2006) looked at the effects of control on effort. They found that
control entails a hidden cost as most participants (agents) reduced their effort, which was
chosen at a cost to the agent, in response to hurdles set by the principal. When asked for
their emotional perception of control, most agents who reacted negatively said that they
perceived the controlling decision, to set a hurdle, as a signal of distrust and a limitation
of their autonomy. Falk and Kosfield (2006) suggest that agents do not like being
restricted. They also suggest that agents perceive controls as a signal of distrust and low
expectations.
Employee reactions to monitoring and control matter because organizations have
a strong stake in maintaining both employee motivation and well-being. Most researchers
suggest that monitoring technology itself is neutral, and that it is the design and
implementation of the technology that affects employee reactions (Alder and Ambrose
2005). For instance, Stanton and Weiss (2000) claim that when employers provide
adequate justification for monitoring there are generally few negative effects. However,
most of this evidence comes from employee surveys and interviews, as there is very little
empirical evidence on the matter.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The negative effects of rewards, incentives, and punishment on internal
motivation have been well documented by researchers (Gneezy et al. 2011; Deci et al.
1999). Behavioral theorists predict that the same phenomenon, known as “crowding out,”
will also be a factor in the relationship of monitoring and internal motivation (Frey 1994).
Because monitoring has a direct effect on task effort through the control system, studying
the links between monitoring, intrinsic motivation, and effort is difficult. In the past,
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researchers have overcome this problem by using intrinsically motivating tasks, such as
puzzle solving. Researchers have manipulated the control system, and then measured
how well the participants performed on the task, their attitude toward the task, or the time
they spent working on the task during free-time (Wiersma 2011). However, the value of
this research, and its theories, is limited for managerial research because most workrelated tasks are not purely intrinsically motivating, yet people still perform work-related
tasks with varying levels of performance under various levels of controls and monitoring.
For this reason, Self-determination theory (Gagné and Deci 2005) serves as more
practical way of viewing motivation for work-related tasks.
Self-determination theory posits that motivation represents a continuum from no
motivation (amotivation) to completely internal motivation, with different levels of
external motivation in the middle. The levels of external motivation range from being
completely controlled and performing a task, to being completely autonomous and
performing a task. One major point is that when one autonomously performs a task, it
does not necessarily mean that the task is intrinsically motivating. Self-determination
theory suggests that intrinsic motivation concerns experiencing activities as being
interesting and spontaneously satisfying, whereas autonomous extrinsic motivation
concerns experiencing activities, not as interesting or fun, but as personally important for
one’s self-selected aims, goals, and purposes (Gagné and Deci 2005). Autonomous
extrinsic motivation results from the internalization of an extrinsically motivated
behavior into a personally endorsed behavior. The importance of this theory, especially to
managerial research, is that it shows how monitoring and control can affect motivation on
tasks that are not inherently intrinsically motivating. According to the Self-determination
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theory, the monitoring and control of an agent should increase external motivation and
decrease the internalization of any goals or values associated with the task or job.
Conversely, trust and autonomy should increase internal motivation and increase the
internalization of task goals. In my hypothesis, I attempt to test these propositions.
Mandatory Task Quantity and Quality
When the agent is performing a simple mandatory task, monitoring may be a
substitute for internal motivation. Consistent with traditional agency theory, since most
individuals are not intrinsically motivated to perform common work tasks, monitoring
should increase effort spent by the agent. However, the increase effort may be focused
only on the monitored aspects of the task since the agent has less internal motivation to
focus on other aspects of the task.
If monitoring increases external motivation and lowers internal motivation, then it
should negatively affect discretionary effort, as shown in Figure 2.1. In this experiment,
monitoring of the agent is such that quality is less observable, more difficult to measure,
and left more to the discretion of the worker, than quantity. In the event of a loss of
intrinsic motivation that may result from monitoring, quality is likely to suffer before
quantity.1 This leads to the following substantive hypotheses about quantity and quality:
H1a:

All else equal, production quantity increases as the intensity of monitoring
increases.

H1b:

All else equal, production quality decreases as the intensity of monitoring
increases.

1

Hypothesis 1b may fail to be supported if monitoring drives quantity, and there is a high level of
performance spillover (Hecht et al. 2012), where an increased attention to one task measure (quantity)
positively affects other areas of the task (quality).
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?

Figure 2.1.Thoeretical Model: The link between external motivation and discretionary or
optional effort is weak and may depend on the agent’s perception that it truly is optional.

Optional Task Volunteer Rates and Effort
Some researchers have suggested that performance and effort, on all but the
simplest job design, can be categorized into two parts, task performance and contextual
performance (see Motowildo and Van Scotter 1994). Borman and Motowidlo (1993)
defined task performance as activities that are formally recognized as part of the job and
that contribute to the organization’s technical core, while they defined contextual
performance as individual behavior that is discretionary and that in the aggregate
promotes the effective functioning of the organization. For example, when an individual
performs extra work tasks voluntarily, or provides thoughtful ideas and feedback to
management, that would qualify as contextual performance but not necessarily as task
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performance. While it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of “internal motivation
versus control” on the various aspects of mandatory task performance, it should not be as
difficult to disentangle the effects of “internal motivation versus control” on contextual
performance because contextual performance often falls outside of the control system,
and should be driven, mostly, by internal motivation. If monitoring decreases intrinsic
motivation, contextual performance should decrease as well. From this logic I draw my
last two hypotheses.
H2a:

All else equal, increased task-monitoring intensity decreases volunteer
rates on optional tasks.

H2b:

All else equal, increased task-monitoring intensity decreases the effort
spent on optional tasks.

RESEARCH DESIGN
This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at large public university.
Twelve sessions were held and each session included either 9 or 10 participants. A
diverse group of 114 adult volunteers participated. Participants were recruited through the
university email newsletter, flyers, and word of mouth. Participants self-registered online
and chose the session date and time they preferred. Upon arrival, the participants were
given a short demographic survey, as shown in Appendix A. Question 6 was a distractor
to help disguise the purpose of the study, and 7 through 9 were exploratory, potential
covariates. Table 2.1 shows the key demographics collected from the participants.
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Table 2.1
Demographics of Research Sample by Treatment Group

Male
Female

Trust
Monitored
19
19

Human
Monitored
17
21

Electronically
Monitored
18
20

18-24
Over 24

23
15

26
12

Student Nationality
Domestic
International
Not a Student

23
14
1

Business Student
Business Student
Non-Business Student
Not a Student
College Level
Fresh/Soph
Junior/Senior
Graduate
Non Student

Gender

Total
54
60
114

Percent
47%
53%
100%

18
20

67
47
114

59%
41%
100%

24
10
4

21
12
5

68
36
10
114

60%
32%
9%
100%

14
23
1

11
23
4

11
21
6

36
67
11
114

32%
59%
10%
100%

19
13
5
1

18
8
8
4

8
12
10
8

45
33
23
13
114

39%
29%
20%
11%
100%

Age
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The sessions were pre-assigned one of three monitoring treatments: electronic
monitoring as the most intense treatment,2 human monitoring as a mid-level treatment,
and trust (no monitoring) as a low-level treatment. When the participants arrived they
were provided a consent form and demographic survey. Next, their attention was directed
to the white board where the task schedule and compensation plan were explained. All
the participants were told that they were being paid a $10 flat wage to complete 27minute task. They were told that the flat wage meant that it did not matter how much
work they performed but they must work the entire time. The participants were told that
they would have a short free time break after the task before moving on to different tasks.
The short break allowed for the chance to offer optional work, as explained below.
Individuals in the electronic monitoring treatment had one small webcam facing
their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in Appendix B. The
goal of the webcam placement was to create the perception that the focus of the
monitoring was on quantity of work. This monitoring design is tantamount to input
monitoring (see Pendergrast 2

) where the agent’s inputs, such as work time, progress,

and resources are closely watched, but the output is unknown or unmonitored. The
purpose of this monitoring design was to create a task control system where work quality
was more discretionary than work quantity. Participants in the electronically monitored
group received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except they were
told that “you are being monitored with webcams so we can observe your work and make

2

While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits
stronger reactions from the worker (Aiello and Kolb 1995; Lund 1992; Stanton 2000).
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sure you follow the instructions as given.”3 Unbeknownst to the participants, the
webcams were not activated. However, the experimenter and research assistant sat
prominently at a corner workstation that the subjects believed to be the “monitoring
station.” The setup was designed so that when the monitoring station was manned the
subjects believed they were being monitored and when the station was unmanned the
subjects believed they were not being monitored. The station was manned for the entire
task period but not during the free time break when the optional task was offered.
Participants in the human monitored group were subjected to traditional human
monitoring and received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except
they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can observe your work and make
sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher and the research assistant
wandered around the room and passively observed the participants during the task time
but left the room during the free time break when the optional task was offered. .
Individuals in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the
other groups. However, they were told that “you will not be watched and we believe you
will follow instructions as given.” In this treatment, all research personnel then left the
room and returned when time was up4 and then left again during the free time break when
the optional task was offered.
All the participants performed a data correction task, based on the experimental
design used in Stanton and Sarkar-Barney (2003). The computer at the participant’s

3

This wording used in the participant instructions is based on the wording used in the study by
Enzle and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling
electronic monitoring on intrinsic motivation.
4

Rousseau et al. (1998, 395) defined trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”
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workstation had a spreadsheet opened up. Each row on the spreadsheet represented a
different invoice, and each column contained a data point such as invoice number,
invoice date, customer name, customer address, items bought, total due, etc. There were a
total of 24 data points for every one of the 50 invoices provided. Each participant was
told to crosscheck the electronic database records against hardcopies of the invoices,
which were bound in a folder at the workstation. The participants were told they were
checking behind an individual who entered the data very quickly and that they each had
different invoices except for the first sample invoice; all actually received the same data.
The sample invoice was worked with them, on a projector, by the researcher as an
example. Each invoice had between one and five errors, randomly distributed, with an
average of three errors per record. Appendix C shows an actual invoice used, and
Appendix D shows part of the spreadsheet used in the experiment.
After the participants completed the 27-minute task, they were told that they were
to take a short “free time” break where they could rest, check their cell phone, or open up
the Internet browser.5 They were asked not to speak to anyone in person or on the phone.
Immediately after being informed of the free time options, they were told the following:
“Also, let me direct your attention to the back of the invoice folder. There you will find
three feedback forms. The feedback you provide helps us to improve the task you
performed. The feedback forms are optional and not required.” All research personnel
then left the room for the remainder of the break. The participants had approximately 5
minutes of break time. The three feedback forms requested responses on a Likert Scale

5

This was the first of three experiments for which the participants had volunteered that day,
providing the context for this “break” time. The participants were told in the consent form that they
should not leave the room until the session is completely over.
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had eight questions per form, and could be filled out in less than 1 minute per form, as
shown is Appendix E.
Two measures were taken from the analysis of this optional task: whether the
participant volunteered (binary), and if so, the effort expended. If the participant filled out
any forms (volunteered) then effort expended was measured by the participant’s outcome
on the optional task. If the participant only partially completed the voluntary optional task
by filling out 1 or 2 feedback forms than effort expended was lower than if the participant
completed the task by filling out all 3 feedback forms.
RESULTS
Mandatory Task Quantity
Consistent with traditional agency theory, Hypothesis 1a predicts that, all else
equal, production quantity would increase as the intensity of monitoring increased. The
mean number of invoices checked was 17.16 for the trust treatment, 17.29 for the human
monitored treatment, and 16.68 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in Panel
A of Table 2.2. An ANOVA (Panel B of Table 2.2) shows no significant difference (p=
.83) between treatment groups in the quantity of work performed on the assigned task.
Including covariates to the analysis did not change this result. The power of the ANOVA
is approximately .60, assuming a medium effect size and alpha risk set at .10. Therefore,
the hypothesis is not supported. The monitoring regime had little effect on production
task quantity.
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics and ANOVA for Work Quantity by Monitoring Treatment
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Obs.
38
38
38
114

Mean
17.16
17.29
16.68
17.04

Std. Dev
4.67
4.63
4.54
4.58

Min
10
6
8
6

R- squared
Adj R-squared

0.00
-0.01

MS
3.85
3.85
21.27
20.96

F
0.18
0.18

Max
26
29
28
29

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Number of Observations
Root MSE

114
4.61

Source
Model
Treatment
Residual
Total

Partial SS
7.70
7.70
2361.08
2368.78

df
2
2
111
113

Prob > F
0.83
0.83

Note: Work Quantity is measured as the number of records checked during the task time, regardless
of quality. Individuals checked a box for each record they reviewed. This was cross-checked against
the number of electronic records altered. No difference was found between the two measures.
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Production Task Quality
Hypothesis 1b predicts that, all else equal, production quality will decrease as the
intensity of monitoring increased. When monitoring was applied, the quality of the work
was more discretionary than the quantity of work. For this reason, quality is considered
discretionary effort. Quality was operationalized at the number of errors corrected
divided by the number of errors in the invoices checked. The seeded errors ranged from
one to five per document, and averaged around three errors per record regardless of the
number of records that the participant completed.
The mean quality was .864 for the trust treatment, .816 for the human monitored
treatment, and .820 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in Panel A of Table
2.3. The ANOVA in Panel B of Table 2.3 shows a difference in the quality of work
performed on the task between treatment groups (p= .069). Including covariates to the
analysis did not change this result. In a planned comparison between the Trust group and
the two monitored groups, the Trust group shows a significantly higher rate of
discretionary effort (p= .02), as shown in Panel C of Table 2.3. Thus, Hypothesis 1b is
supported.
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Table 2.3
Summary Statistics and ANOVA for Work Quality by Monitoring Treatment
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Obs.
38
38
38
114

Mean
0.864
0.816
0.820
0.833

Std. Dev
0.083
0.109
0.107
0.102

Min
0.578
0.455
0.474
0.455

R- squared
Adj R-squared

0.05
0.03

Max
0.970
0.952
0.978
0.978

Panel B: ANOVA Results
Number of Observations
Root MSE

114
0.100

Source
Model
Treatment
Residual
Total

Partial SS
0.055
0.055
1.121
1.176

df
2
2
111
113

MS
0.028
0.028
0.010
0.100

F
2.74
2.74

Prob > F
0.069
0.069

Contrast
1
1

Value of
Contrast
0.047
0.047

Std Error
0.020
0.018

df
111
93

Sig. 2-tailed
0.02
0.01

Panel C: Planned Comparison

Assuming Equal Variance
Not Assuming Equal Variance

Note: Work quality is measured as the number of errors corrected divided by the number of errors
encountered during the task time, regardless of quantity. Errors were randomly distributed and
averaged around three per record.
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Volunteer Rates for Optional Task
Hypothesis 2a predicts that, all else equal, task-monitoring intensity will be
negatively related to volunteer rates on optional tasks. Volunteer rates for optional tasks
were measured by the willingness of the participants to offer any optional feedback
during their free time break.
The proportions of volunteers were .737 for the trust treatment, .763 for the
human monitored treatment, and .921 for the electronically monitored group, as shown in
Panel A of Table 2.4. The results show, through a logistic regression, a significant
difference in the volunteer rates for optional tasks across treatment groups. The
electronically monitored group showed a higher propensity to volunteer (p= .04), as
shown in Panel B of Table 2.4. The Chi-square analysis confirms a difference in the
number of volunteers across treatment groups (p= .09).
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Table 2.4
Optional Task Volunteer Rates by Monitoring Treatment: Summary Statistics, Logistic
Regression, and Chi-Square Test
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Obs.
38
38
38
114

Mean
0.737
0.763
0.921
0.807

Std. Dev
0.446
0.431
0.273
0.396

Min
0
0
0
0

Observations
LR chi2 (2)
Prob > chi2

114
5.440
0.066

Z
2.02
0.26
2.79

P>|z|
0.04
0.79
0.01

Max
1
1
1
1

Panel B: Logistic Regression
Log likelhihood
Pseudo R2

-53.20
0.05

Volunteered
Electronic Monitoring
Human Monitored
Constant

Coef.
1.43
0.14
1.03

Std. Error
0.71
0.53
0.37

Panel C: Chi-Square Test and Fisher's Exact

Treatment
Trust
Human Monitored
Electronic Monitored
Total

Volunteered
No
Yes
10
28
9
29
3
35
22
92

Pearson's Chi-Squared Test
Pearson chi (4) = 4.8
Pr = 0.09

Total
38
38
38
114
Fisher's Exact Test
Fisher's Exact = 0.09

Note: The paticipants had the opportunity to volunteer to provide feedback during a short free time
break after their task. Volunteers were coded as 1 if the particpant volunteered to provide any
optional feedback about the clerical task they performed for a flat wage, and 0 otherwise.
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These results are contrary to Hypothesis 2a, which states that monitoring intensity
will decrease volunteer rates for optional tasks. Conversely, I find evidence that the
relationship may be positive. The analysis of Hypothesis 2b, concerning the effort
expended, however, provides a more complete picture.
Effort Spent on Optional Tasks
Hypothesis 2b predicted that, all else equal, task-monitoring intensity would be
negatively related to the effort spent on optional tasks by volunteers. In this experiment,
the effort spent on optional tasks is measured by the participant’s output on the optional
task. If the participant only partially completed the voluntary optional task by filling out
one or two feedback forms than effort expended was lower than if the participant
completed the task by filling out all three forms. The results from the volunteer rate
analysis, above, show that as monitoring increased more individuals volunteered for the
optional task. Table 2.5 reveals, however, that as monitoring increases more people
volunteer, but that they tend not to complete the task.
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Table 2.5
Frequency Analysis of Optional Task Outcomes

Treatment
Trust
Human Monitor
Electronic Monitor
Total

Abstained
10
9
3
22

Outcome
Partial
9
14
19
42

Complete
19
15
16
50

Total
38
38
38
114

Stastistical Analysis
Pearson's Chi-Squared Test
Pearson chi (4) = 8.0
Pr = 0.09

Fisher's Exact Test
Fisher's Exact = 0.08

Note: This table examines the effects of monitoring intensity on the outcomes of an optional task,
filling out feedback forms about a mandatory task. Particiants either abstained, started but
did not complete, or completed the task.

Once the decision was made to give feedback, the trust group spent the most
effort on feedback. On average, the trust group filled out 2.43 feedback forms, the human
monitored group filled out 2.14 feedback forms, and the electronically monitored group
filled out 2.11 feedback forms (summary not shown). Since my measure of effort was the
participant’s outcome on the optional task, it is appropriate to use Pearson’s Chi-square
Test and isher’s Exact Test, as shown in Table 2.5. The results show a significant
statistical difference across groups between the number of individuals who abstain, give
partial feedback, and give full feedback, at the . 9 confidence level for the Pearson’s Chisquare Test and . 8 for the isher’s Exact Test. The ratio of those of who start but fail to
complete the optional task to those who start and finish the task is .47 to 1 for the trust
group, .93 to 1 for the human monitored group, and 1.19 to 1 for the electronic
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monitoring treatment. Overall the results support Hypothesis 2b, that all else equal, taskmonitoring intensity is negatively related to the effort spent on optional tasks. Including
covariates in the analysis did not change this result.
CONCLUSION
This study finds evidence that traditional agency theory models are wrong when
they assume that monitoring cannot reduce worker effort. Further, this paper seems to
indicate that there does not have to be a psychological bond broken between the agent
and the principal for monitoring to have an effect on effort. Evidence is shown to support
the idea that there are significant “hidden costs monitoring” which are often elusive to
managers and researchers. The effects of monitoring often go unnoticed because they
aggregate outside of the monitoring system, where lower internal motivation can be
expressed with fewer repercussions for the agent.
These findings may also help to suggest, or explain, certain aspects of job design
and performance such as those laid out by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) suggest that an employer, when faced with multiple employees and
multiple jobs, should group jobs that can be easily measured together and assign those
jobs to one group of employees, while assigning the other group of employees jobs that
cannot be easily measured. This paper supports this recommendation, especially if the
measurement process involves input monitoring.
It is reasonable to assume from the evidence shown in this paper that monitored
individuals may work at a slightly lower effort levels than trusted individuals on
mandatory work tasks. In this experiment, there were no difference in work quantity, but
the trust monitored group had higher work quality. These finding support the conclusion
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of past studies that show the movement toward more flexible workplaces (Shepard et al.
1996) and telecommuting increase overall output (Westfall 2004).
In this study, as monitoring increased so did volunteer rates, even though the
monitor left the room during the time the optional task was performed. There are at least
three reasons why this outcome may have occurred. First, it is possible that the monitored
individuals assumed they were still being monitored even when the monitor had left the
room. Second, the control of the monitoring may have carried over psychologically for a
short time. Third, the controlled individuals may have cherished the return of their
freedom. It is unknown if one these possibilities, or a combination, led to the higher
volunteer rates. However, one thing is clear, as volunteer rates for the optional task
increased, the average effort spent on the optional task, by those who volunteered,
decreased. This decrease in effort is indicative of lower internal motivation.
Future research should focus more on learning how internal controls affect the
performance of optional work tasks and discretionary parts of mandatory tasks. With the
increasing complexity of the work environment and the increasing demand for customer
service, optional and discretionary effort is increasingly important. Another interesting
avenue of research is the interaction of pay schemes and monitoring intensity on optional
and discretionary effort.
This research design in this study has several limitations that also offer avenues
for future research. A very short time dimension is considered in this experiment. It is
likely that over time individuals will change their behavior with respect to monitoring;
however some research suggest that the change could be decreased tolerance rather than
acclimation to intense monitoring (Smith et al. 1992). Although this research design has
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limitations, it has the opportunity to open up new lanes of research on the topics of
monitoring, control, and performance.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF MONITORING ENVIRONMENT ON
PROBLEM SOLVING ABILITY
INTRODUCTION
In a successful organization, employees and managers should be creative and
mentally flexible. This is especially true in the public accounting profession, where
change is constant and the demand for services is high. Bonner and Lewis (1990)
described “problem solving adaptability,” in the auditing context, as the ability to
recognize relationships, interpret data, and reason analytically. Similarly, Baril et al.
(1998) claim that the ability to recognize that there are a variety of solutions to a
particular problem is important to success in the accounting profession.3 While
researchers have tended to focus on individual characteristics correlated with problem
solving (Gibbins and Jamal 1993), Libby and Luft (1993) warn that research which fails
to consider the environment will miss important determinants of performance, since
environmental factors affect motivation, knowledge, and ability. One increasingly
important, but often overlooked, environmental variable is worker autonomy.
Some researchers have suggested that strict environmental controls can have
detrimental effects on creative thinking (Hennesey and Amabile 1998; Elsbach and
Hargadon 2006), which is critical for finding the optimal solution to complex problems.4
Individuals are likely to be most creative when they experience high levels of intrinsic
motivation (Amabile 1996), since such motivation increases their tendency to be curious,

3

Many researchers have suggested that the ability to recognize and/or check for multiple solutions
may be critical to auditor performance (e.g., Hieman 1990; Bierstaker at al. 1999).
4

Luchins (1942, 37) was one of the first researchers to suggest that authoritarian control may
increase problem solving fixation.
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cognitively flexible, risk taking, and persistent in the face of barriers (Utman 1997; Zhou
and Shalley 2003). Similarly, the theory of social facilitation states that individuals have
various social, physiological, behavioral, and cognitive reactions to being monitored,
watched, or judged (Zajonc 1965; Aiello and Douthitt 2001), which undermine
performance on complex tasks, but positively affect performance on simple tasks. The
purpose of the current research is to extend the managerial literature by investigating the
effects of the monitoring environment on key aspects of individuals’ problem solving
ability.
In this research design, I use an adaptation of Luchins’s (19 2) water-jar task5 to
examine pattern establishment, problem solving rigidity (pattern breaking), and problem
solving creativity, under three different types of worker monitoring. One hundred
fourteen participants were assigned to one of three monitoring treatments, trust (no
monitoring), human monitoring, and electronic monitoring. Once the treatment was
induced, the participants were given the water-jar problems to test the three different
aspects of their problem solving ability. Using computer illustration, the water-jar task
gives the participant three water jars (Jar A, Jar B, and Jar C) of different sizes and asks
them to fill one of those jars to a specific volume, a volume not directly available by
filling only one of the jars (Appendix F shows the water-jar task user interface and the
bottom of Appendix G shows the participant’s answer form). Participants are then
instructed to use the simplest method possible to solve each problem. They are allowed

5

Fessler (2003) is one of the few research experiments in the recent managerial accounting
literature to use the water-jar tasks. His research focused on task attractiveness, compensation scheme, and
performance. In earlier accounting research, Stedry (1960) used the water-jar task to look at goal difficulty
and goal acceptance.
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two minutes to solve each problem by writing their answer on the answer form, but can
move on to the next problem if finished before the time limit.
The first several problems (Problems 1- 6) all have the B-A-C-C solution as the
correct answer. These problems test the participant’s ability to establish and rely on a
pattern. The next three problems (Problems 7-9) offer a simpler solution (either A-C or
A+C) as well as the B-A-C-C solution. These dual answer problems are known as
“critical problems.”6 Normally, most individuals who have found and used the pattern
will become blind to the simpler solutions available to solve the critical problems, and
will continue to use the pattern answer. Luchins (1942) labeled the solution blindness
“Einstellung” effect.7 These problems (Problems 7-9) test the participant’s susceptibility
to Einstellung blindness. The final three problems (Problems 10-12) all have different
solutions, which increase in complexity, and test the participant’s ability to solve
complex problems. Appendix G shows a summary of the problem types the participants
face as they progress through the water-jar task, and the answer sheet provided.
Based on past literature, I hypothesize that participants in the monitored
treatments will 1) have more difficulty finding and using the pattern, 2) more often fail to
recognize when the pattern is no longer efficient (Einstellung blindness), and, 3) solve
fewer complex problems than individuals in the trust treatment. I find evidence to support
the first two hypotheses related to pattern establishment and pattern breaking, and less
clear, but interesting, evidence concerning the third hypothesis related to complex
problem solving. With respect to complex problem solving, an interesting interaction

6

For examples and more explanations of the terminology associated with the water-jar task, see
Schultz et al. (1997).
7

Einstellung means “setting” or “to set” in erman.
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between an individual’s self-reported base ability and the monitoring environment was
found. Individuals who reported being good in the related ability underperformed on
complex problem solving in a trusting environment and outperformed in the human and
electronic monitored environments.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND
Problem solving rigidity and Einstellung blindness are not just laboratory
phenomena but are common cognitive biases.8 Research suggests that even people who
are professionals in their domain can miss simple solutions to “critical problems.”9 For
example, Bilalić et al. (2008) showed that master chess players can become fixated to
complex chess strategies after performing the same moves several times, and miss
simpler effective moves. Similarly, evolutionary scientist Stephen Jay Gould (1996)
discussed, in his controversial book The Mismeasure of Man, how scientists can be so
strongly influenced by a theory they already hold, and have experience with, that they do
not interpret new data objectively. In an accounting domain example, Marchant et al.
(1991) found that expert tax preparers were slower to adapt to new tax laws because they
failed to consider new relevant information.
Problem solving and creativity have been examined in conjunction with a variety
of environmental and personal factors. In examples of environmental factors, researchers
have shown that individuals can become rigid in their problem solving abilities when in
stressful situations (Schultz and Searleman 1998; Cowen 1952) or faced with aggression
(Carnevale and Probst 1998). Conversely, individuals who receive positive affect (Isen et
8

Cognitive Bias is defined as a pattern of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular
situations, which may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation,
or irrational behavior (Ariely 2009).
9

“Critical problems” in this context is defined as problems with multiple solutions.
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al. 1987) or who work on complex tasks with autonomy have been found to develop more
creative ideas (Hatcher et al. 1999; Tierney and Farmer 2004). In examples of personality
factors, researchers have shown that the “five factor” personality dimension of
“openness” is associated with creativity (Fiest 1998) while Erikson (2012) found that
“thinking” types of personalities appear to be resistant to problem solving rigidness and
fixation.10
Financial and managerial accounting researchers have been interested in
“fixation” for some time. A popular line of research is concerned with why some
individuals appropriately update their decisions in response to changes in accounting
methods and some individuals do not (Wilner and Birnberg 1986). The failure to adapt
decisions to a change in accounting method is referred to as accounting fixation.
Accounting fixation is indicated by the inability of users of accounting information to
look behind the labels attached to accounting numbers (such as "cost" or "income") to
adjust for changes that have occurred in the accounting techniques or methods used to
determine that number (Bloom et al. 1984). Dearman and Shields (2005) argue that the
ability to adapt one's decision process to a change in accounting method will be a
function of one's task-relevant knowledge, problem solving ability, and intrinsic
motivation. However, Wiley (1998) suggests that experts may be more prone to fixation
because their domain-specific knowledge hinders their search for new information.
Given the role of auditors and public accountants in dealing with fraud and
misreporting, understanding cognitive biases that hinder hypothesis generation and
problem solving adaptability is critical. For instance, Bierstaker and Wright (2001)

10

See Shalley et al. (2004) for review of contextual factors, personal factors, and interactions that
affect creative thinking skills.
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showed that practical problem solving ability was significantly correlated with
performance on internal control evaluation tasks. Bonner and Lewis (1990) assert that
problem solving ability, which they describe as the ability to recognize relationships,
interpret data, and reason analytically, is one of the main determinants of auditor
expertise. Further, SAS 56 calls for auditors to identify unexpected patterns in financial
data and to hypothesize about the likely cause. However, auditors may become fixated on
past patterns, and hypotheses, causing them to fail to incorporate all the new information
they have at their disposal (Mock and Wright 1993; Wright and Bedard 2000). The
failure to incorporate new data may lead to lower quality audits and, ultimately, more
financial misstatements and financial fraud.
Problem solving rigidity works against the auditor’s ability to solve unique
problems and to reason analytically. In related examples, Mock and Wright (1993),
looking at 74 random audits, found a weak relationship between client risks and audit
programs. They also found that audit programs changed little over time with many tests
done across a broad array of engagements. This is troubling since auditors are supposed
to avoid becoming predictable, lest management and employees easily avoid the auditor’s
tests.
Asare and Wright (2003), in a laboratory experiment, examine the linkage among
the initial hypothesis set, the information search, and decision performance in analytical
procedures. They find that auditors who inherit, or generate, an incorrect hypothesis set,
but still receive balanced evidence, do not perform well because they are unwilling or
unable to generate additional hypotheses during the investigation phase, and they have
difficulties integrating evidence that does not fit with their current hypothesis set. While
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Asare and Wright (2003) acknowledge that auditors become fixated on certain
hypotheses, they do not address the causes of fixation. Research into the environmental
and personal factors which cause auditors or managers to become fixated on hypotheses
and solutions may be important to the advancement of techniques and practices.
In this research, I investigate the effects of monitoring environment on different
aspects of problem solving ability and problem solving fixation. If monitoring affects
problem solving, the effects are likely attributable to social facilitation. The theory of
social facilitation states that individuals have various social, physiological, behavioral,
and cognitive reactions to being monitored, watched, or judged (Zajonc 1965; Aiello and
Douthitt 2001). One common finding in the social facilitation literature is that monitoring
negatively affects performance on complex tasks, and positively affects performance on
simple tasks.11 Since problem solving tasks are inherently complex,12 there should be a
negative relationship between monitoring intensity and most aspects of problem solving
capabilities.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The water-jar task can be broken down into three parts: the first involves pattern
recognition and use, the second Einstellung blindness, and the third complex problem
solving ability. Accordingly, I test for the effect of the monitoring environment on each
part of the task, as shown in Appendix G. In the first part, the participant will establish a
pattern, known in the problem solving literature as a mental set. When a mental set is
established, the participant will tend to stop looking for new solutions and rely on the
known pattern. Research suggests that high stress and low intrinsic motivation may
11

The causes of social facilitation are thought to be primordial (Blascovich et al. 1999).

12

Bonner et al. (2000, 25) describe problem-solving tasks as being complex.
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activate individuals’ need for closure, increasing the use of heuristics (Kruglanski and
Fruend 1983) and leading individuals to lessen their search for new information (Klein
and Webster 2000). Establishing a mental set usually leads to an increase in structure and
a decrease in uncertainty (Shultz and Searleman 1997). If one is not enjoying the problem
solving process, they will likely engage in the problem solving mental process for a
shorter period of time, and will likely not stay open to the possibility of new solutions.
With simple tasks, higher levels of monitoring should increase pattern recognition,
pattern reliance, and the use of shortcuts.
However, the water-jar task is complex,13 and as such, may be negatively affected
by monitoring. In the presence of other people, by the phenomena known as social
facilitation,14 people tend to improve performance on simple tasks but their performance
is impaired on complex tasks (Zajonc 1965, 1980). Aiello and Shao (1993) extended the
social facilitation theory to include electronic monitoring by showing that when a task is
the least bit complex (i.e., requires some thought) electronic monitoring lowers
performance. In the water-jar task, being able to recognize and use the pattern solution
requires complex thought. It is likely that individuals who are monitored at higher levels
will not recognize and use the pattern efficiently, causing them to miss the pattern
solution problems more often than individuals who are not monitored. Therefore I make
the following substantive hypothesis:
H1:

Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will fail to recognize and
use a pattern more often than those who are not monitored at a higher
level.

13

Fessler (2003, 165) establishes that the water-jar task is considered a complex task.

14

Bond and Titus (1983) provide a meta-analysis of 241 studies related to social facilitation.
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In the second part of the water-jar task, after working six problems where the
pattern solution was the best answer, the participant will be tested for Einstellung
blindness with the next three problems. These problems offer the pattern solution from
the earlier problems, but offer a simpler solution as well. The simpler solution is actually
the correct solution, as the instructions are to give the simplest solution possible as their
answer. As noted above, researchers have found that time constraints and stress lead to an
increase in Einstellung blindness (Luchins 1942; Schultz and Searleman 1998). Thus,
individuals who feel monitored or controlled will suffer from Einstellung blindness at a
higher rate than those who do not feel monitored. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2:

Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will have Einstellung
blindness more than those who are not monitored at a higher level.

In the third part of the water-jar task, the final three problems, the participants will
have their analytical and complex problem solving skills tested by attempting to solve
problems which have only complex solutions, and which increase in difficulty from one
problem to the next. Creativity, which is essential for complex problem solving, is
defined as the ability to transcend traditional ideas, rules, patterns, relationships, or the
like, and to create meaningful new ideas, forms, methods, and interpretations.15 Creativity
in this context will be even more difficult because research has shown that once a mental
set has been established in past problems, one will likely continuously attempt to apply
the rule until they have a moment of insight (see Knoblich et al. 2008) and realize that
that past rules are ineffective (Fantino et. al 2003).
Researchers have noted that when individuals use an established rule to solve
problems, they have difficulty solving problems when the established rule no longer
15

This definition is from www.dictionary.com.
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works as a viable solution (Smith and Blankenship 1991). For example, Schultz and
Searlemen (1998) found that, under stress, participants took an average of 43 seconds to
work the pattern solution problems once they had established a pattern, but it took them
an average of 64 seconds to solve simpler problems that did not have the pattern solution,
after they were accustomed to the pattern solution. Additionally, 26% of their participants
could not solve the simpler problems at all, in the time allotted. Given the time
constraints in the current study (120 seconds) and the fact that all the previous problems
can be answered using one (if the participant has Einstellung blindness) or two (if the
participant does not have Einstellung blindness) simple rules, the added stress of being
monitored should decrease the participant’s ability to solve complex problem. This leads
to the third hypothesis.
H3:

Individuals who are monitored at a higher level will solve fewer complex
problems than those who are not monitored at a higher level.
RESEARCH DESIGN

This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at large public university.
Twelve sessions were held, each with either 9 or 10 participants. A diverse group of 114
adult volunteers participated, recruited through the university email newsletter, flyers,
and word of mouth. Participants self-registered online and chose the session date and
time they preferred. Upon arrival, they were given a short demographic questionnaire, as
shown in Appendix A.
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The sessions were pre-assigned to one of three monitoring treatments: electronic
monitoring as the most intense treatment,16 human monitoring as a mid-level treatment,
and trust (no monitoring) as a low-level treatment. When the participants arrived they
were provided a consent form and demographic questionnaire. Table 3.1 shows the
demographics of the participants. Next, their attention was directed to the white board
where the task schedule and compensation plan were explained. With respect to the task
schedule, the participants worked on a data-correction task, for a flat wage, for
approximately 27 minutes, before working on the water-jar task. The prior task was used
to acclimate the participants to their monitoring treatment and the environment in
general, and to collect data for a separate study.

16

While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits
stronger reactions from the worker (Aiello and Kolb 1995; Lund 1992; Stanton 2000).
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Table 3.1
Demographics by Treatment Group

Male
Female

Trust
Monitored
19
19

Human
Monitored
17
21

Electronically
Monitored
18
20

18-24
Over 24

23
15

26
12

Student Nationality
Domestic
International
Not a Student

23
14
1

Business Student
Business Student
Non-Business Student
Not a Student

Gender

Total
54
60
114

Percent
47%
53%
100%

18
20

67
47
114

59%
41%
100%

24
10
4

21
12
5

68
36
10
114

60%
32%
9%
100%

14
23
1

11
23
4

11
21
6

36
67
11
114

32%
59%
10%
100%

College Level
Fresh/Soph
Junior/Senior
Graduate
Not a Student

19
13
5
1

18
8
8
4

8
12
10
8

45
33
23
13
114

39%
29%
20%
11%
100%

Good at Mental Math
Yes
No

23
15

29
9

20
18

72
42
114

63%
37%
100%

Age

Note: This table shows the key demographics for each treatment group. The Mental Math
category shows the response to the statement, "I consider myself good with mental math
and numbers."
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Participants in the electronic monitoring treatment had a small webcam facing
their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in Appendix B.
Participants in this electronically monitored group received all the same task instructions
as the other two groups, except they were told “you are being monitored with webcams
so we can observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as given.”17
Unbeknownst to the participants, the webcams were not activated. However, the
experimenter and research assistant sat prominently at a corner workstation that the
subjects believed to be the “monitoring station.” The station was manned for the entire
task period.
Participants in the human-monitored group received all the same task instructions
as the other two groups, except they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can
observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher
and the research assistant wandered around the room and passively observed the
participants during the task time.
Participants in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the
other groups, but were told “you will not be watched and we believe you will follow
instructions as given.” In this treatment, all research personnel left the room and returned
when time was up.
When the water-jar task began, the students were given answer sheets and
instructed to open the water-jar task slideshow on their computer. The researcher then
introduced the participants to the task and walked them through the first two examples,
which had the answers already entered on the answer sheet, as shown at the bottom of
17

This wording used in the participant instructions is based on the wording used in the study by
Enzle and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling
electronic monitoring on intrinsic motivation.
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Appendix G. The last two examples were worked with the participants, who had to enter
the answers on the answer sheet. The researcher made sure that everyone entered answers
for the example problems correctly before allowing the problem portion of the task to
begin. The four example problems ensured that each participant had at least a basic
understanding of how to complete the task before being allowed to proceed to the actual
problems.
The actual experimental task consisted of twelve problems. Participants had a two
minute time limit on each problem18 and were instructed to move on if they ran out of
time, or as soon as they solved the problem. They were told that they would be
compensated based on the number of correct solutions they gave, and that if more than
one solution to a problem was found then the simplest solution, the one with the least
moves, was the correct one. If they finished the task quickly they were to sit quietly until
time was up.
RESULTS
Pattern Recognition
Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will more
often fail to recognize and use a pattern than those who are not monitored at a higher
level. In this experiment, one was considered to have recognized and used the pattern if
they correctly answered at least 5 of the 6 pattern problems given in the task (the first six
problems had the B-A-C-C19 solution). With respect to monitoring levels, as discussed

18

The participants had two minutes to solve each problem. At the bottom of each problem was a
timer bar that filled up, to mark the time. When the bar became full a bell sounded and the words “click to
the next slide” appeared across the screen.
19

Read as “B minus A minus C minus C.”
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above, electronic monitoring was the most intense treatment, human monitoring was a
mid-level treatment, and trust (no monitoring) was a low-level treatment.
Out of the 114 participants, 79 recognized and used the pattern solution correctly,
while 35 did not. Table 3.2, Panel A, shows summarizes the number of participants who
recognized the pattern, by treatment. Seven people in the trust treatment failed to
recognize the pattern, 12 in the human monitoring treatment, and 16 in the electronic
monitoring treatment. A Chi-square analysis of the table (bottom of Panel A) shows that
pattern recognition was not independent of monitoring treatment (p= .081). In addition
the effect seems to occur exactly as hypothesized, with pattern recognition negatively
related to monitoring intensity. Using Somers’ d, a directional test of association of one
ordinal/ranked measure (treatment) and one nominal measure (pattern recognition),
shows the relationship is significant (p=.02; seen at the bottom of Panel A).
Self-perceived mental math ability is positively associated with pattern
recognition (p= .01; analysis not shown) and the treatment groups were imbalanced with
respect to mental math ability, as shown in Table 3.1. Of individuals in the electronic
monitoring treatment, 47% indicated on the demographic questionnaire that they were not
good at mental math, compared to 24% for the trust treatment, and 39% for the human
monitored treatment. To consider mental math ability and monitoring treatment together,
a logistic regression is used where the dependent variable is binary for pattern
recognition, and monitoring treatment and mental math ability (binary) are the
independent variables. Panel B shows that, after controlling for mental math ability,
human monitoring (versus the benchmark of the trust group) decreases pattern
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recognition (p= .096), and electronic monitoring decreases pattern recognition (p= .012).
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
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Table 3.2
Pattern Recognition by Treatment Group
Panel A: Pattern Recognition by Treatment

Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Recognize Pattern
No
Yes
Total
7
31
38
12
26
38
16
22
38
35
79
114

Pearson Chi² = 5.03
Somers' d = -0.158

Pr= 0.081
Pr= 0.020

Panel B: Logistic Regression of Treatment and Mental Math on Pattern Recognition

Log likelhihood
Pseudo R2

Observations
LR chi²
Prob > chi²

-64.49
0.083

114
5.440
0.001

Logistic regr

Log likelihoo

Variable
Mental Math
Electronic Monitoring
Human Monitored
Constant

Coef.
1.11
-1.15
-0.95
0.91

Std. Error
Z
0.44
2.51
0.55
-2.10
0.57
-1.66
0.47
1.93

P>|z|
0.012
0.036
0.096
0.053

Note: Panel A of this table shows the number of participants who recognized the pattern
solution of the water-jar task, by treatment group. A participant is considered to have
recognized the pattern if they got at least six of the seven pattern problems correct.
Panel B shows a logistic regression of the data in Panel A but also controls for the
participant's self-reported mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the
demographics questionnaire. P-values < .05 are bolded; those < .10 are italicized.
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Pattern
MentalMath
treat_3
treat_2
_cons

Einstellung Blindness
Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will have
Einstellung blindness more than individuals who are not monitored at a higher level. In
this experiment, an individual is considered to have Einstellung blindness if they answer
Problem 7, the first dual answer problem, with pattern answer (B-A-C-C) instead of the
simpler solution (A-C). The simpler solution was the correct solution, as the participants
were instructed to use the simplest answer available.
Of the 114 participants, 51 failed to see the simpler solution and instead used the
pattern solution (Einstellung blindness), 55 properly used the simpler solution, and eight
used neither the simpler solution nor the pattern solution (missed the problem
completely). If Einstellung blindness is the cause for roughly half of the participants
continuing to use the pattern solution, then there should be a positive correlation between
pattern recognition/use and Einstellung blindness, since one could not be blinded by a
pattern they were not relying upon. Panel A of Table 3.3 confirms this proposition. Of the
51 participants who were blind to the simpler solution, 45 recognized and used the
pattern solution correctly and 6 did not. Of the 55 participants who were not blind to the
simpler solution 33 recognized and used the pattern solution correctly and 22 did not. A
Chi-square analysis (bottom of Panel A) shows that the effect of pattern recognition on
Einstellung blindness is significant (p= .001).
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the number of Einstellung blindness participants by
treatment, isolated to those who recognized and used the pattern solution. The table
shows that the participants in the trust treatment were less susceptible to Einstellung
blindness than those in the other two treatments. In all, 51% (17/33) of those who
recognized the pattern but did not suffer Einstellung blindness were in the trust treatment,
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while 31% (14/45) of those who recognized the pattern but did suffer Einstellung
blindness were in the trust treatment. A Chi-square analysis of the table (bottom of Panel
B) shows that Einstellung blindness was not independent of monitoring treatment (p=
.022). However, the effect does not seem to occur exactly as hypothesized (with pattern
recognition negatively related to monitoring intensity). It seems that the Einstellung
blindness is more likely in the human monitoring than in the electronic monitoring. Using
Somers’ d, as a directional measure of association of one ordinal/ranked measure
(treatment) and one nominal measure (Einstellung blindness), shows the relationship is
not significant (p= .478) when monitoring intensity is ranked (bottom of Panel B).
Panel C of Table 3.3 shows the results for a logistic regression examining the
effects of the monitoring treatment on Einstellung blindness (binary) while controlling
for the effects pattern recognition (binary) and self-reported mental math ability (binary).
The results show that mental math ability is negatively related to Einstellung blindness
(p= .10), while pattern recognition is positively related to Einstellung blindness (p< .001).
The human monitoring treatment is positively associated with Einstellung blindness (p=
.005) while the there is little difference in the other two groups.20

20

The regression in Panel C of Table 3.3 yields similar results, with respect to the monitoring
treatments, when using only the 78 participants who recognized the pattern, and omitting pattern
recognition as an independent variable.
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Overall, the evidence supports Hypothesis 2, which states that individuals who are
monitored at a higher level will have Einstellung blindness more than those who are not
monitored at a higher level. While questions remain as to why participants in electronic
monitoring treatment were less susceptible to Einstellung blindness than the human
monitoring treatment, there is little doubt that monitoring affected this area of problem
solving.
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Table 3.3
Einstellung Blindness by Pattern Recognizers and Treatment Group
Panel A: Blindness by Pattern Recognition

Pattern Recognition
No
Yes
Total

Einstellung Blindness
No
Yes
Total
22
6
28
33
45
78
55
51
106

Pearson Chi² = 10.85
Fisher's Exact

Pr= 0.001
Pr= 0.002

Panel B: Einstellung Blindness by Treatment for Pattern Recognizers

Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Einstellung Blindness
No
Yes
Total
17
14
31
5
20
25
11
11
22
33
45
78

Pearson Chi² = 7.62
Somers' d = 0.69

Pr= 0.022
Pr= 0.478

Panel C: Logistic Regression of Treatment, Mental Math, and Pattern
Recognition on Einstellung Blindness
Observations
106
Log likelhihood
-62.14
LR chi²
22.510
Pseudo R2
0.153
Prob > chi²
0.000
Variable
Mental Math
Pattern Recognition
Electronic Monitoring
Human Monitored
Constant

Coef.
-0.81
2.09
0.19
1.61
-1.71

Std. Error
0.49
0.59
0.53
0.57
0.65

Z
-1.64
3.55
0.35
2.81
-0.27

P>|z|
0.100
0.000
0.724
0.005
0.008

Note: Panel A and B of this table show the number of participants who were
susceptable to Einstellung blindness, by pattern recognition and treatment,
respectively. A participant is considered to have Einstellung blindness if they
gave the pattern answer to Problem 7 instead of the simpler answer. Panel C
shows a logistic regression of the data in Panel A and B, but also controls for the
participant's self-reported mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the
demographics questionnaire. P-values < .05 are bolded; those < .10 are
italicized.
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Complex Problem Solving
Hypothesis 3 states that individuals who are monitored at a higher level will solve
fewer complex problems than those who are not monitored at a higher level. In this
experiment, the last three problems had increasingly complex answers. The answers to
Problem 10, 11, and 12 were B-A+C, B-C-C+A, and A+C+C+C+C, respectively.21 Few
participants answered all three of these problems correctly, given the time constraints
(120 seconds) and the fact that all the previous problems could be answered using one or
two simple rules.
Of the 114 participants, 9 (7.8%) did not answer any of the three correctly, 47
(41.2%) answered 1 of the three correctly, 43 (37.7%) answered two of the three
correctly, 13 (11.4%) answered all three correctly, and 2 (1.7%) participants did not
follow directions (spent more than 120 seconds on one or more of these three problems).
However, Panel A of Table 3.4 shows little difference in the average number of complex
problems solved across groups. Participants solved 1.49 complex problems on average in
the trust treatment, 1.53 in the in the human monitoring treatment, and 1.59 in the
electronic monitoring treatment. A linear regression of monitoring treatment on the
number of complex problems solved, as shown in Panel B of Table 3.4, confirms that,
even after controlling for mental math ability, monitoring treatment does not seem to
have a strong effect on complex problem solving skills. Therefore Hypothesis 3, as
stated, is not supported.

21

Given that the order of operations does not differ for addition and subtraction, different versions
of these answers were considered as if they were given. For example, B-C-C+A is equal to B+A-C-C.
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Table 3.4
Complex Problem Solving by Treatment Group

Panel A: Summary Statistics for Complex Problem Solving
Treatment
Trust
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Total

Obs.
37
38
37
112

Mean
1.49
1.53
1.59
1.54

Std. Dev
0.768
0.762
0.900
0.805

Min
0
0
0
0

Panel B: Regression Results for the Effects of Monitoring Treatment and
Mental Math Ability on Complex Problem Solving
Number of Observations
Root MSE

112
0.810

Source
Mental Math
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Constant

Coef
0.171
0.016
0.127
1.380

R- squared
0.01
Adj R-squared -0.01
Std Err
0.163
0.189
0.189
0.167

t
1.05
0.08
0.67
8.25

P>|t|
0.295
0.934
0.505
0.000

Panel C: Regression Results for the Interaction of the Monitoring Treatment
and Mental Math Ability on Complex Problem Solving
Number of Observations
Root MSE

112
0.783

Source
Mental Math
Human Monitoring
Electronic Monitoring
Mental Math*Human Monitoring
Mental Math*Electronic Monitoring
Constant

Coef
-0.481
-0.563
-0.508
0.880
1.100
1.790

Std Err
0.265
0.335
0.279
0.400
0.370
0.209

R- squared
Adj R-squared

0.10
0.05

t
-1.81
-1.68
-1.82
2.20
2.97
8.53

P>|t|
0.073
0.095
0.072
0.030
0.004
0.000

Note: Panel A shows the summary statistics for the number of complex problems solved
by each treatment group. Panel B shows the results for a regression of self-reported
mental math abiltiy (binary), as reported on the demographics questionnaire, and
monitoring treatment on complex problem solving. Panel C Shows the interaction of
mental math ability and monitoring on complex problem solving. P-values < .05 are
bolded; those < .10 are italicized .
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Max
3
3
3
3

Past research suggests, however, that there may be an interaction of perceived
ability and different types of monitoring regimes on complex problem solving ability. For
instance, Davidson and Henderson (2000) found that the visual presence of electronic
monitoring resulted in an easy task being performed with greater proficiency and a
difficult task being performed with less proficiency. In their study, when participants
tried to solve an easy task, the presence of electronic monitoring resulted in their mood
state becoming significantly more positive; but when solving a difficult task, electronic
monitoring caused a more negative mood state. Therefore, for robustness, an interaction
effect between monitoring treatment and mental math ability on complex problem
solving is considered.
Panel C of Table 3.4 shows that when interactions between self-perceived mental
math ability and monitoring treatments are considered in a regression, they are highly
relevant. The positive interaction terms indicate that, for persons higher on self-perceived
mental math ability, monitoring increases their performance. Hence, the effect of
monitoring on complex problem solving depends on the person’s perceived mental math
ability.
Figure 3.1 shows the predicted marginal means for the interaction. Interestingly,
the results suggest that individuals who thought they were good at mental math and were
monitored (human and electronic) performed very well, while those who thought they
were good at mental math and were not monitored (trust) performed poorly. Conversely,
individuals who were less confident in their base ability and in the trust treatment (left
alone) performed very well, but such individuals who were monitored (human and
electronic) performed poorly. One possible explanation for this finding is that those who
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are confident like to be watched, possibly lowering stress or making the task seem more
attractive, while those who are not confident do not like to be watched, as it may raise
stress or make the task seems less attractive. More research should be done to determine
the relationship of ability, monitoring, and performance.
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Figure 3.1: Adjusted Marginal Means for the Interaction of Monitoring Treatment and
Self-reported Mental Math Ability on Complex Problem Solving
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CONCLUSION
Creative problem solving is increasingly important in many business domains.
While much is known about personal characteristics that are important for creative
problem solving, less is known about how the environment affects an individual’s
problem solving abilities. As such, organizations may choose their internal control
systems without fully understanding the effects the controls will have on their employees’
ability to solve problems. I add to the current literature by investigating the effects of
three different monitoring regimes (trust monitoring, human monitoring, and electronic
monitoring) on three different areas of problem solving (pattern recognition and use,
Einstellung blindness [pattern breaking], and complex problem solving skills).
The results indicate that the monitoring environment does influence individuals’
problem solving. For the most part, problem solving performance is negatively related to
monitoring intensity. However, when solving complex problems, if an individual is
confident in his or her base skills, then the negative effects of monitoring intensity may
be mitigated or even reversed. These findings are consistent with the theory of social
facilitation, which states that individuals have various social, physiological, behavioral,
and cognitive reactions to being monitored, watched, or judged (Aiello and Douthitt
2001). One common finding in the social facilitation literature is that monitoring
undermines performance on complex tasks, and improves performance on simple tasks.
More research should be done to determine how the awareness of social facilitation can
be incorporated into management theory, and ultimately be used to help to improve job
training, job design, and job performance.
With respect to accounting and auditing, this paper discusses an often overlooked
phenomenon that may contribute to lower audit quality, increased misstatements, and
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fraud—Einstellung blindness. Einstellung blindness is a stealth cognitive bias related to
problem solving rigidity and functional fixation. In short, Einstellung blindness occurs
when one has been exposed to the same type of problem and solution so many times that
they become cognitively blinded to any other solution. While not widely studied in recent
business literature, the impact of Einstellung on various business- and accounting-related
job duties (e.g., auditing, tax compliance, and managerial decision making) could be
substantial. In this paper I show that participants who are monitored at a higher level have
Einstellung blindness more often than those who are not monitored at a higher level.
Individuals in the auditing profession may be especially susceptible to Einstellung
blindness for at least three reasons. First, auditors often repeat similar tests which yield
similar results. Second, auditors are often under time pressure. Third, auditors usually
have their work monitored, or are subject to monitoring during their audit tasks. More
research should be conducted to examine if, and how, Einstellung blindness affects audit
quality. A similar line of thought can be extended to other areas of the accounting and
managerial domains.
Lastly, while a wealth of interesting research exists on the effects of financial
incentives on performance and motivation in the managerial accounting literature
(Bonner et al. 2000), there has been considerably less research on the effects of
monitoring and control on motivation and performance. Since monitoring and incentives
are thought to be the two main sources of organization control (according to traditional
agency theory), more work should be done to develop similar knowledge on each topic.
In this aspect, this research answers Christ et al.’s (2 12) call to further develop our
understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls on the agent’s behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
DOES MONITORING AFFECT THE AGENT’S
PREFERENCE FOR HONESTY?

INTRODUCTION
It is firmly established in the business literature that monitoring increases effort
and deters dishonest behavior within a firm (e.g., Hölmstrom 1979; Jensen and Meckling
1976). This conclusion is logical, and rational, since any self-interested agent should
work hard and be honest to avoid the possibility of sanctions if caught shirking or being
dishonest. Despite the importance of monitoring in the firm, there is little research in the
accounting and managerial literature addressing the effects of monitoring and control on
the individual psyche.22 or instance, how monitoring affects the agent’s attitude toward
dishonesty and misreporting is largely an unanswered empirical question. This is an
important issue because past research has shown that attitude is highly correlated with
intent and future behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). Since attitude/rationalization is
considered one of the three sides of the fraud triangle (PCAOB 2005; Cressy 1973),
understanding the relationships among monitoring, attitudes, and (dis)honesty is vital to
the design of internal controls, financial regulation, and the prevention of fraudulent
behavior.
This study proposes that monitoring negatively affects the agent’s attitude
towards honest reporting by “crowding out” the agent’s intrinsic motivation to be honest
and enabling the rationalization of deviant behavior. This theory is tested by
experimentally investigating whether the type of monitoring affects an individual’s
22

For a broad review of honesty in managerial research see Salterio and Webb (2006).
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behavioral honesty. In this experimental design, participants were assigned to one of
three monitoring treatment groups: a trust treatment,23 a human monitored treatment, 24
and an electronically monitored treatment.25 Once the treatment was induced, the
participants performed a simple mental math task where a monetary reward was given
based upon task performance. Half the participants in each treatment group self-reported
their results, while the other half had their results verified by the researcher. Dishonesty
was operationalized by examining the difference in means between the “self-score
regime” and the “verify regime” of each treatment group (see Ariely et al. 2

9 for a

similar research design). As hypothesized, the results of the experiment show that there
was more dishonesty in the human monitored treatment and the electronically monitored
treatment than the trust treatment. Interestingly, less dishonesty was detected in the
electronic monitoring treatment than the human monitored treatment.
Psychology research suggests that individuals can be either internally or
externally motivated to perform a task or carry out a behavior. When an individual
already is intrinsically motivated to perform a behavior, controlling or incentivizing that
behavior may externalize the motivation (Ryan and Deci 2000; Frey and Oberholser-Gee
1997). Externalizing intrinsic motivation can have negative consequences such that when
the external control mechanism is removed or weakened the incentive to perform the
behavior is diminished from its original state (Deci et al. 1999).

23

Rousseau et al. (1998, 395) defined trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”
24

Human monitoring is sometimes referred to as “traditional monitoring” in the academic
literature (e.g., Stanton 2000).
25

While electronic monitoring and traditional human monitoring have the same fundamental
purpose, past research suggest that the pervasive, continuous nature of electronic monitoring often elicits
stronger reactions from the worker (Aiello and Kolb 1995; Lund 1992; Stanton 2000).
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Researchers across multiple disciplines have found that most individuals are
intrinsically motivated to be honest, and behave as if there is a “cost of lying” that must
be covered before a lie is told (Lundquist et al. 2007; Gibson et al. 2012; Gneezy 2005).
Although individuals behave as if there is a cost of lying, for most people that cost is not
high; most individuals will lie for a small amount of gain (Gneezy 2005; Baiman and
Lewis 1989). This suggests that there is a trade-off between being honest (internal
gratification) and receiving a payoff by being dishonest. Empirical research suggests that
personal characteristics and situational circumstances determine the point at which a lie
becomes acceptable for each person.26 Ariely et al. (2009) posit, in their theory of SelfConcept Maintenance, that individuals are only honest enough (partially honest) to
convince themselves of their own integrity. They state that “a little bit of dishonesty gives
a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view” (p. 3).This finding is consistent
with several experiments which show that individuals are more likely to be a little
dishonest than completely honest or completely dishonest. These two streams of research,
together, suggest that individuals will lie for a small amount of gain, but will limit the
impact of, or gain from, their lie to a certain threshold so that the lie does not alter their
self-image. If monitoring negatively alters one’s attitude toward honesty, facilitating
rationalization of fraudulent behavior, then it is likely that it will also cause individuals to
lower their threshold for dishonesty (“cost of lying”), and to the extent that rationalization
allows one to be dishonest and still maintain their positive self-image, monitoring will
also increase ones capacity for ill-gotten gains.
26

Several researchers have looked at the causes of deviant behaviors such as lying and
misreporting. Personal characteristics such as Machiavellianism (Fulmer et al. 2009; Murphy 2012) and
self-control (Ariely et al. 2009) along with situational characteristics such as the business climate
(Crutchley et al. 2007) and controls (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011) have been examined recently in the
business literature.
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By examining the effects of monitoring on behavior, this research answers Christ
et al.’s (2 12) call to further develop our understanding of the potential consequences of
formal controls. Also, by positing that monitoring affects the participant’s attitude toward
misreporting, leading to rationalization, I heed the call of Hogan et al. (2008) to design
studies in which multiple elements of the fraud triangle are examined simultaneously. As
discussed above, the evidence suggests there may be a natural tension between the effects
of control mechanisms and the externalization of intrinsic motivation. Thus, an attempt to
reduce one side of the triangle (opportunity) through monitoring may weaken another
side of the triangle (rationalization). The understanding of the relationship between these
two opposing forces is important to the design of effective regulation and internal
controls.
This study continues an interesting line of research in the accounting literature
that is concerned with how the business environment can influence an individual’s
propensity to commit fraudulent or deviant behavior in accounting and managerial related
domains. With regard to the “fraud triangle,” researchers are interested in the
rationalization and attitudes related to dishonest behavior, whether they are developed
through the tone at the top (Rezaee 2005), contract design (Evans et al. 2001), the vertical
and horizontal equity of compensation (Matuszewski 2010), personality traits (Murphy
2012), or other factors. The current research adds to the managerial accounting literature
by investigating the possibility that monitoring, which is meant to prevent dishonest
behavior, may actually promote dishonesty, under some circumstances, by making it
easier for the agent to rationalize dishonesty.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides more theory and
background, Section III develops the hypothesis, Section IV describes the research
design, Section V provides the results, and Section VI gives the summary and conclusion.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND
For the most part, honesty in the accounting and finance literature is discussed in
the framework of agency theory and/or fraud prevention. In both of these frameworks,
monitoring is usually viewed in a positive light, where the only restraint on monitoring
and control is the monetary limits of the principal (e.g., Zajac and Westphal 1994;
Hansen 1997). However, some research suggests that that there are “hidden costs,” and
unanticipated effects, of monitoring and control. Some of these costs and effects derive
from the fact that, given an acceptable option or alternative, people will choose not to be
controlled. In other words, as a person’s autonomy is removed, their internal motivation
to cooperate with the authority is diminished (Spector 1986). However, the implicit costs
of control are not well understood and are rarely considered in theoretical models. This
paper addresses one dimension of these costs by looking at the effects of monitoring on
the agent’s behavioral honesty.
Honesty in Economics and Psychology
Honesty in the psychology literature is often contrasted with the view of honesty
in the economics literature. The standard economic perspective of behavior is one of
homo economicus, where the individual is a rational and selfish entity interested only in
maximizing their own external payoffs. For homo economicus, the decision to be honest,
or dishonest, depends only on the expected benefit versus the expected cost. This costbenefit tradeoff means that decisions about honesty are like every other decision that
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individuals face. For homo economicus, all else equal, an increase in reward will always
increase a behavior, while an increase in punishment, or cost, will always decrease a
behavior.
In contrast, the psychology literature holds that in addition to the external reward
mechanisms, there also exist internal reward mechanisms and that these internal rewards
influence individuals’ decisions. The external and the internal reward mechanisms
interact to determine if, and to what extent, an individual performs a behavior. From this
interaction there is a non-linear relationship between honesty and the reward for being
dishonest (see Ariely et al. 2008). However, because of differences in individual values,
preferences, and cognition, the functional relationship between honesty and the reward
for being dishonest seems to vary greatly between individuals and situations (Gibson et
al. 2012).27
Gneezy (2005), in a simple game where one participant had the option to tell the
truth or lie to another participant about the payoff from various options that they would
split, found that the decision maker uses the “truth telling” outcome as a reference level
when evaluating the benefits of lying. The monetary consequences of the lie are
compared to this reference level. The decision maker is selfish in the sense of
maximizing their own payoffs, but sensitive to the cost the lie imposes on the other side.
Sensitivity diminishes with the size of payoffs. Moreover, since the perception of the
counterpart’s cost is subjective, when there are differences in wealth as in employeeemployer relationship or a consumer-insurer relationship, the lower wealth decision
maker is more likely to be dishonest.
27

In the article titled “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small Scale
Societies,” Henrich et al. (2 1) test individuals from different types of societies to determine how much
their decision making deviates from rational models.
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Since some behaviors, such as an individual’s concern for the counter-party, are
not consistent with the characteristics of homo economicus, additional theories have been
developed to help account for the discrepancies between economic-rationality and actual
human behavior. For example, the theory of Self-Concept Maintenance (Ariely et al.
2008) posits that individuals are practically always in a win-lose situation where every
decision is a trade-off between being honest and receiving an intrinsic reward or gaining
from deception. However, instead of making a decision to be honest or dishonest,
individuals usually look for a compromise. Individuals are often dishonest, but they limit
their dishonest activity to a point where they do not have to change their own selfperception. The theory posits that the changing of one’s self-perception is undesirable, or
costly; but being partially honest offers the individual the “best of both worlds,” gaining
from dishonesty but still perceiving themself to be an honest and ethical person. The
theory of Self-Concept Maintenance is pertinent to the study of “monitoring and honesty”
because the type of monitoring may affect the internal threshold of dishonest behavior
one can engage in and not have to update their self-identity.
Honesty and Agency Theory
Agency theory is the most comprehensive and widely accepted theory in
managerial research and organizational design. Agency theory is useful in research, and
practice, because it makes explicit predictions about how individuals are likely to behave
under different contractual designs. To arrive at such predictions, agency theorists make
assumptions about the people involved in the contracts, the entities offering and
accepting the contracts, and the informational environment (Eisenhardt 1989). One of the
main assumptions that agency theorist make about individuals is that they are rationally
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self-interested, similar to homo economicus. Accordingly, a great deal of research has
looked at relaxing this strict assumption (see Cuevas-Rodriguez et al. [2012] for a recent
review). For example, researchers have found that the inclusion of trust (Beccerra and
Gupta 1999), reciprocity (Kuang and Moser 2009), and social norms (Fehr and Falk
2002) into agency theory can dramatically alter the predicted outcomes of contracts.
Interestingly, experimental managerial accounting research has been a fruitful
area for the study of behavioral agency theory models. Participative budget experiments,
in particular, offer a unique setting where the information environment and/or the
incentive structure of contracts, in the principal-agent relationship, can be manipulated
and the effects of the manipulation on the agent’s reporting and production decisions can
be measured (Brown et al. 2009). This research is unique in the business literature
because it allows researchers to empirically examine some determinants of honesty in an
organizational setting. While more than two dozen published participative budget
experiments in the managerial accounting literature over the past twenty years have
addressed managerial reporting,28 here, I review a few papers from a widely cited line of
work that deals explicitly with honesty.
Evans et al. (2

1) specifically examined how agents’ preferences for honesty and

wealth affect their reporting of private information. In their experiment the managers
(participants) privately observe the cost of production and report it to the principal, who
provides the amount requested. The agent keeps any surplus from over reporting and
cannot be auditing or monitored. Interestingly, they found that, of the available surplus
that the agent could have kept with impunity, the agents actually returned 47.6% through

28

See Brown et al. (2009) for a review of participative budget experiments in the managerial
accounting literature.
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full or partial honesty. Evans et al. (2001) compare their results to the average of several
dictator game experiments, where a participant simply decides how much of total sum to
share with a person they have never met but has entrusted them with gains. In the dictator
games the participants give back, on average, 18% of their gains. They attribute the
difference, between budget experiment (47.6%) and dictator experiment (18%), to the
fact that in the budget experiment the participant had to tell a lie to receive the surplus, in
which case their preference for honesty, or partial honesty, affected their gain.29
Hannan et al. (2006) examine honesty in the participative budget setting under
different levels of information asymmetry, while maintaining the trust setting from Evans
et al. (2001). In their experiment the main variable was the precision of an information
system (coarse or precise) that signaled the actual costs to the principal, although the
principal has no power to deter dishonesty. They show that agents' reporting decisions are
affected by how they trade off the psychological benefits of appearing honest against the
economic benefits of misrepresentation. The precision of the information system affects
the agent's trade-off by changing the ability of the principal to infer the agent's level of
honesty. They find that honesty is lower under a precise information system than under a
coarse information system because the incremental cost of appearing honest is higher
with a precise system.
Rankin et al. (2008) extend the findings of Evans et al. (2001) and Hannan et al.
(2006) by distinguishing more clearly whether agents' tendency to report private
information more truthfully, despite an economic incentive to be dishonest, is due to
honesty or to other non-pecuniary motivations such as fairness or reciprocity. They
29

Fredrickson and Cloyd (1998) had similar findings and concluded, from agents' self-reported
motivations, that personal integrity is the most important factor limiting slack in their experimental
budgetary setting.
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manipulate whether the agent's budget report does or does not require a factual assertion,
noting that while fairness preferences could come into play in both conditions, honesty
should come into play only when agents are required to make a factual assertion. They
find more honest reporting when a factual assertion is required, indicating an incremental
effect of honesty beyond other non-pecuniary preferences. In addition, Rankin et al.
(2008) examine whether their finding holds when the principal rather than the agent has
final budget authority. They find that the incremental effect of honesty is no longer
significant when the principal has final budget authority. They also provide evidence
suggesting that this may be because agents frame the situation as an ethical dilemma
when the agent has final authority, but as a negotiation in which each party acts in his or
her self-interest when the principal has final authority.
Overall, the evidence from the managerial accounting literature suggests that, all
else equal, agents have a preference for partial honesty when there is a reward for lying.
Agents will limit their dishonesty because they also have a preference for non-pecuniary
benefits such as fairness, reciprocity, and honesty. The results of these experiments show
the complexity of human decision making by suggesting that people “want their cake and
they want to eat it too.”
A common element of many of the participative budget experiments is the use of
low monitoring to measure innate honesty. The study presented in this paper is unique
because it attempts to measure how different monitoring environments affect honesty. I
posit that monitoring makes it easier for agents to rationalize dishonesty when the
opportunity arises, which may lead to an increase in dishonest behavior in environments
where monitoring intensity is higher.
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Honesty, Fraud, and Internal Controls
Fraud prevention and internal controls are concerned with preventing financial
crimes, deterring misreporting, and safeguarding firm assets. Fraud involves intentional
acts and is perpetrated by human beings using deception, trickery, and cunning
(Ramamoorti 2

8). Since fraud involves people’s capacity to deceive, and be deceived,

it is important to understand the psychological factors that might influence these types of
behavior. Therefore, most work related to honesty and fraud prevention, or internal
controls, is concerned with how and why individuals commit acts of fraud and deceit in
the workplace or financial markets.
Despite increases in regulation and ethical training in the post Sarbanes-Oxley
era, fraud and misreporting continue to be a pertinent threat to capital markets and
internal controls (Hogan et al. 2008). Behavioral research, which exposes some shortcomings of theories based on economic rationality, suggests regulation and punishment
may not affect decision making as much as previously thought. Further, ethical training
may not be as effective if individuals delude themselves of their moral identity as the
theory of Self-Concept Maintenance suggests. In light of the increases in reported fraud
and financial crime, regulators have called for more research on the how to prevent or
detect fraud (Hogan et al. 2008).
In their 2009 Global Economic Survey, PricewaterhouseCoopers described fraud
and misreporting as pervasive, persistent, and pernicious.30 Thirty percent of the 3,037
respondents reported dealing with either fraud or misreporting, at some level, over the
past year. They also report that the amount of misreporting caught by internal controls in

30

The PWC report can be seen at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/2009global-economic-crime-survey.jhtml.
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trending down over time. Also, only 7% of misreporting and fraud cases were initially
discovered by whistleblowing-related activity. In addition to the uptick in financial fraud
reported in the PWC survey, the SEC Enforcement Division announced that in 2011 it
filed the most enforcement actions ever in a single year. 31 The evidence suggests that,
despite the massive amount of resources spent on fraud prevention in the past ten years,
fraud and misreporting are no less pervasive than they were before.
Statement on Auditing Standards 99, issued by the Auditing Standards Board of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in October 2002,
describes the fraud triangle. The fraud triangle is used by auditors to assess fraud risk
because, generally, the three fraud triangle conditions (incentive, opportunity, and
rationalization) are present when fraud occurs. First, there is an incentive or pressure that
provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, there is an opportunity, and ability, for fraud
to be perpetrated (e.g., absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of
management to override controls.) Third, the individuals committing the fraud possess an
attitude that enables them to rationalize the fraud.
Hogan et al. (2008) suggest that, unlike incentive and opportunity, rationalization
has received little attention from researchers. This research posits that monitoring affects
an individual’s attitude toward misreporting. Attitude is highly correlated with intent
(Ajzen and Fishbein 2005), which triggers action and rationalization. Rationalization is
described by Tsang (2002) as the cognitive process that individuals use to convince
themselves that their behavior does not violate their moral standards. The way the fraud

31

The SEC press release is found at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-234.htm.
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triangle is conceptualized may need to be re-evaluated if it is shown that increased
monitoring makes it easier to rationalize misreporting.
The standard assumption of the fraud triangle is that incentives and pressure
motivate misreporting while lax controls facilitate misreporting (Hogan et al. 2008).
Individuals are generally viewed as being predisposed to character traits that partially
determine the extent to which they rationalize their deviant behavior (Murphy 2012).
However, the theory proposed in this paper is that not only do incentives promote
misreporting but strong controls may also promote deviant behavior by crowding out the
intrinsic motivation to be honest, making it easier to rationalize dishonest behavior. A
similar line of thought was explored by Belot and Schröder (2013). In their research
experiment participants were hired for a job which had several options for deviant
behavior (poor performance, tardiness, or theft). They found that increasing monitoring
on one measure (performance) led to increased deviance in another measure (tardiness).
They concluded that workers do “retaliate” in some way for being monitored.
The findings in this line of research have implications for the study, not only of
managerial misreporting, but also whistleblowing, collusion, and worker satisfaction. As
the recent wave of public accountants involved in insider trading scandals has shown,
most fraud involves several collaborators—inside the firm, and sometimes outside the
firm—who turn a blind eye to the unethical behavior (Burns and Kedia 2008). Often the
collaborators and potential whistleblowers have different incentives, attitudes, and
personality traits, but are subject to the same monitoring mechanisms. Their attitudes
toward the monitoring systems may be a driver in their decisions to coalesce for or
against the monitors.
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The fraud triangle suggests that the three conditions of incentive, opportunity, and
rationalization are present when an individual commits a fraudulent act. The incentive is
generally monetary in nature, while opportunity is generally conceptualized as the
perception that one can perpetrate the fraud while not getting caught (Murphy and Dacin
2011). Agency theory assumes that all individuals have a natural predisposition toward
fraud, and once an individual has the incentive and the opportunity to commit fraud, the
rationalization is as simple as a cost-benefit calculation. However, and as psychology
theories suggest, prior accounting literature has shown that individuals act more honestly
than agency theory would predict (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Hannan et al. 2006), suggesting
that other influences, such as past experience and the environment, impact individuals’
ability to commit and rationalize fraudulent behavior.
Researchers have identified several categories of rationalization that are often
employed by perpetrators, such as moral justification, advantageous comparison,
euphemistic labeling, minimization of the act, denial of the victim, and diffusion of
responsibility (Murphy and Dacin 2011). However, understanding how individuals
rationalize fraudulent behavior does not fully explain what characteristics of the
environment, or situation, prompted the individuals to act out the deviant behavior. After
all, most individuals in a position to commit fraud have a good reputation (Anand et al.
2004) which facilitates their ability to deceive others. In this study I posit that monitoring
can affect an individual’s attitude toward dishonesty by crowding their intrinsic
motivation to be honest and increasing their ability to rationalize deviant behavior, as
shown in Figure 4.1.

73

Internal
Motivation for
Honesty

Fraudulent
Attitudes and
Rationalization

Monitoring
Intensity

Dishonest
Reporting
Figure 4.1 Theoretical Model

On any particular task, misreporting is directly influenced by the level of
monitoring on the person reporting. For example, individuals may be inclined to cheat
under 100% monitoring, but one is unlikely to cheat, misreport, or be dishonest if they
know for certain they will be caught. However, not misreporting does not mean that one
does not have an inclination to misreport. This inclination may be an important factor in
the decision making process when the opportunity to cheat arises.
Trust and reciprocity have been widely studied in the economics literature (see
Fehr and

chter 1998). One robust conclusion from this research is that when

individuals are trusted they reciprocate with trustworthy behavior (for example, Fehr et
al. 1993; Berg et al. 1995; McCabe et al. 2003). Conversely, research on monitoring and
surveillance has shown that individuals view monitoring, under certain conditions, as a
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signal of distrust32 (Cialdini 1996; Falk and Kosfeld 2006). This signal of distrust may
lower the agent’s internal motivation to treat the principal fairly and increase the agent’s
ability to rationalize dishonest behavior. Based on this logic I derive the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis: When controls are removed or weakened, dishonest behavior will be
higher in an environment where monitoring intensity is higher.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This experiment was carried out in a computer lab at a large public university.
Using a 3X2 experimental design, where each cell included 19 participants, each of the
114 participants was subjected to one of three monitoring treatments and one of two
reporting regimes. Each of the six treatment combinations included two sessions, for a
total of 12 research sessions, with each session including either 9 or 10 participants. The
session dates and times were pre-assigned, and participants self-registered online for the
session they preferred.
Participants were recruited through the university email newsletter, flyers, and
word of mouth. A diverse group 114 adult volunteers participated. Table 4.1 shows the
demographics collected from the participants with a short demographics questionnaire, as
shown in Appendix A, given upon arrival.

32

The signaling of trust and distrust is important in many domains. For example, Mahar (2003)
discusses how many people do not show interest in prenuptial agreements because they do not want to
signal distrust in the pre-marital relationship.
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Table 4.1
Demographics of Research Sample by Treatment Group and Reporting Regime

Treatment
Reporting Regime
Gender
Male
Female

Trust Monitored
Self
Verified

Human Monitored
Self
Verified

Electronically Monitored
Self
Verified Total Percent

9
10

10
9

9
10

8
11

8
11

10
9

54
60
114

47%
53%
100%

12
7

11
8

11
8

15
4

7
12

11
8

67
47
114

59%
41%
100%

Student Nationality
Domestic
International
Not a Student

8
11
0

15
3
1

13
3
3

11
7
1

9
8
2

12
4
3

68
36
10
114

60%
32%
9%
100%

Business Student
Business Student
Non-Business Student
Not a Student

9
10
0

5
13
1

6
10
3

5
13
1

8
8
3

3
13
3

36
67
11
114

32%
59%
10%
100%

College Level
Fresh/Soph
Junior/Senior
Graduate
Non Student

9
7
3
0

10
6
2
1

6
6
4
3

12
2
4
1

3
7
6
3

5
5
4
5

45
33
23
13
114

39%
29%
20%
11%
100%

Mental Math
Yes
No

9
10

14
5

15
4

14
5

10
9

10
9

72
42
114

63%
37%
100%

7
12

9
10

5
14

8
11

8
11

6
13

43
71
114

38%
62%
100%

Age
18-24
Over 24

Tired
Yes
No

Note: Each of the 6 combinations of monitoring treatment and reporting regime had 19 participants. The Mental
Math category shows the answer to the question, I consider myself good with mental math and numbers. While
the Tired category shows the answer to the question, I feel tired today.

76

After administering the demographic questionnaire, the researcher explained the
work schedule and compensation for the participants. The participants in this experiment
had just spent an hour performing two distractor tasks in other experiments not related to
the honesty test. These tasks served to accustom the participants to the environment,
induce the monitoring treatment, and conceal the fact that their honesty was being tested.
In the first distractor task, participants spent about 27 minutes performing a clerical task
where they corrected data in a spreadsheet, for a flat $10 wage. In the second distractor
task the participants spent about 24 minutes solving logic puzzles for a piecewise wage
up to $3. The task that tested their honesty in the current study is explained in detail
below.
The monitoring treatments were the same ones to which the participants had
become accustomed. Individuals in the electronic monitoring treatment had one small
webcam facing their workstation keyboard and papers when they arrived, as shown in
Appendix B. The electronically monitored group received all the same task instructions
as the other two groups, except they were told that “you are being monitored with
webcams so we can observe your work and make sure you follow the instructions as
given.”33 Unbeknownst to the participants, the webcams were not activated. However, the
experimenter and research assistant sat prominently at a corner workstation, which the
subjects believed was the “monitoring station,” while all the tasks were completed.
Participants in the human monitored group were subjected to traditional human
monitoring and received all the same task instructions as the other two groups, except
they were told that “I will walk around the room so I can observe your work and make
33

This wording used in the instructions is based on the wording used in a similar study by Enzle
and Anderson (1993). Their study looked at the effects of controlling versus non-controlling electronic
monitoring on intrinsic motivation.
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sure you follow the instructions as given.” The researcher and the research assistant
wandered around the room and passively observed the participants during all the tasks.
Individuals in the trust treatment received all the same task instructions as the
other groups. However, they were told that “you will not be watched and we believe you
will follow instructions as given.” All research personnel then left the room and returned
when time was up for each task.
The task for this experiment was a short math puzzle. Following Ariely et al.
(2009), participants were given a sheet of paper with 20 numeric matrices, as shown in
Appendix H. Each matrix contained 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 4.29, 3.23). Participants
had 5 minutes to find the unique two numbers that add to 10.00 in as many matrices as
possible. Participants were told, truthfully, that all the matrices had the unique
combination and that they could work the sheet in any manner or order they like. Also, It
was explained that they could earn anywhere from $0 to $5 on this task, depending upon
their performance.
Half the participants in each monitoring treatment were told that writing or
marking on the paper during the work was optional, and no indication or proof that the
combination was actually found would be required. This half of the participants selfreported the number of matrices solved and their work was not verified. Thus, cheating
without detection was possible. The other half of the participants in each monitoring
treatment had to mark their papers to indicate the correct combination, and their work
was verified. Dishonesty was operationalized as the difference in the mean scores
between the self-score and non-self-score participants within a monitoring treatment
group.
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RESULTS
Table 4.2 shows the number of matrices reported as solved across monitoring
treatment and reporting regimes. In the trust treatment, the participants who self-reported
their results reported solving fewer matrixes (8.26) than the participants who knew their
work would be verified (9.68). In the human monitoring treatment, the participants who
self-reported their results reported solving more matrixes (11.58) than the participants
who knew their work would be verified (8.47). Similarly, in the electronic monitoring
treatment, participants who self-reported their results reported solving more matrixes
(8.95) than the participants who knew their work would be verified (8.11).

Table 4.2
Matrices Reported Solved by Treatment and Reporting Regime
Treatment
Reporting Regime

Self

Average Matrices
Std Dev
Min
Max
Obs

8.26
4.87
0
20
19

Trust Monitored
Verified Combined
9.68
4.73
2
18
19

8.97
4.79
0
20
38

Human Monitored
Self
Verified Combined

Electronically Monitored
Self
Verified Combined ALL

11.58
4.07
3
20
19

8.95
3.91
4
20
19

8.47
4.88
1
17
19

10.02
4.70
1
20
38

8.11
5.13
2
20
19

8.53
4.52
2
10
38

9.18
4.67
0
20
114

Note: This table shows the number of matrices reported solved for each combination of monitoring and reporting regime.
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Before proceeding to the formal testing of the hypothesis it is important to note
that there were three extraneous individual differences, from the demographic survey
(shown in Appendix A), which were found to significantly affect the number of matrices
reported as solved (α = .1 , untabulated). On average, males, those who said that they
were good at mental math, and those who said that they were not tired, reported that they
solved more matrices than females, those who said they were not good with mental math,
and those who said they were tired. Past research suggests that these individual
differences may have a direct effect on task performance, or interact with the treatments
to alter performance (or reported performance). For example, some research suggests
that, on average, males are slightly better at mental math (Hyde and Mertz. 2009), but
some research also suggests that males are more likely to be dishonest about their
performance (Dreber and Johannesson 2008). Being tired may affect performance, but
past research also has shown that individual may be more dishonest about their
performance when they are tired (Ariely et al. 2009). Moreover, tired individuals may
feel more pressure to perform in the presence of monitoring, causing an interaction with
the monitoring treatment. Lastly, past research has shown that monitoring intensity
(through work-related stress) may interact with mental ability to affect performance on
tasks (Schultz and Searleman 1998).
These extraneous individual differences (mental math ability, tiredness, and
gender) should be included in the analysis to reduce error variance. As a result of the
quasi-randomization of participants, cell sizes, after inclusion of the controls, are
sufficient to calculate the main effects and all 2- and 3-way interaction terms.34 Levene’s

34

“Higher-order interactions occur rarely” and are difficult to interpret (van Belle 2
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2, 135).

test indicates that the assumption of equality of error variance is not violated (p = .17),
reducing concerns about differences in cell sizes (Neter et al. 1990).
Table 4.3 shows that, consistent with the hypothesis, after accounting for all the
control variables and interactions, the monitoring treatment and reporting regime interact
to affect the number of matrices individuals reportedly solved (p = .027). Further, this
interaction is not affected by the other control variables (none of the three-way
interactions including it are significant), so that I can examine this relationship without
qualification. The other significant effects and interactions in the ANOVA do not relate
to my hypothesis, and are included only to control for extraneous variance in the factorial
design.
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Table 4.3
ANOVA Results
Number of Observations
Source
Model
Monitoring
Reporting
Tired
Gender
Mental Math
Monitoring*Reporting
Monitoring*Tired
Monitoring*Gender
Monitoring*Mental Math
Reporting*Tired
Reporting*Gender
Reporting*Mental Math
Tired*Gender
Tired*Mental Math
Gender *Mental Math
Monitoring*Reporting*Tired
Monitoring*Reporting*Gender
Monitoring*Reporting*Mental Math
Monitoring*Tired*Gender
Monitoring*Tired*Mental Math
Monitoring*Gender*Mental Math
Reporting*Tired*Gender
Reporting*Tired*Mental Math
Reporting*Gender*Mental Math
Tired *Gender* Mental Math
Residual
Total

114

R- squared
0.53
Adj R-squared 0.27

Partial SS
1318.71
91.38
0.06
95.25

df
41
2
1
2

MS
32.16
45.65
0.06
95.25

F
2.01
2.86
0.00
5.97

Prob > F
0.005
0.064
0.953
0.017

121.01
14.80
121.41
93.10
57.10
187.67
3.72
0.12
8.03
6.88
12.86
20.99
5.76
18.19
36.07
3.31
2.64
85.61
0.12
74.67
0.06
4.42
1149.78
2468.49

2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
72
113

121.01
14.80
60.70
46.55
28.55
93.84
3.72
0.12
8.03
6.88
12.86
20.99
2.88
9.10
18.04
1.66
2.64
42.80
0.12
74.67
0.06
4.42
15.97

7.58
0.93
3.80
2.92
1.79
5.88
0.23
0.01
0.50
0.43
0.81
1.31
0.18
0.57
1.13
0.10
0.17
2.68
0.01
4.68
0.00
0.28

0.007
0.339
0.027
0.061
0.175
0.004
0.631
0.933
0.481
0.514
0.373
0.255
0.835
0.568
0.329
0.902
0.686
0.075
0.930
0.034
0.953
0.601

Note: This table shows the five-way ANOVA results for the effects of Monitoring treatment (Trust, Human
Monitoring, or Electronic Monitoring), Reporting regime (self-report or verified), and the dichotomous control
variables self-assessed Tiredness, Gender, and self-assessed Mental Math ability on the number of Matrices the
participants reported as solved. The Monitoring*Reporting interaction is the key effect of interest, and is
unaffected by the control variables, as shown by the nonsignificant 3-way interactions. P-values < .05 are bolded;
those < .10 are italicized.
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Figure 4.2 shows the adjusted means graph for each of the treatment groups. The
slope of each line indicates the effect of verification on reported scores, which is my
proxy for cheating. The slopes of the lines indicate that cheating may have been present
in the human-monitored treatment, and to a lesser extent in the electronically monitored
treatment. No cheating is apparent in the trust monitored treatment.
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Figure 4.2: Matrices Reported as Solved: Results by Reporting Regime and Monitoring
Treatment
Note: Participants either were allowed to self-report without verification, or their reports
were documented and verified. Means are adjusted for Tired, Gender, and Mental Math,
as reported in Table 4.4.
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As shown in Table 4.4, a comparisons of the adjusted means (shown in Figure
4.2) reveals that the reporting regime treatments are not significantly different in the trust
monitoring treatment (p= .593). However, the reporting regime treatment means are
significantly different in the human monitored treatment (p= .035), and, while the graph
does seem to indicate that cheating may have been present in the electronic monitoring
treatment, the means are not significantly different at a high level of confidence (p=
.275). 35 Overall, these results support my hypothesis that, given an opportunity to cheat,
dishonesty will be higher in an environment where monitoring intensity is higher.

Table 4.4
Pairwise Comparison of Adjusted Means
95% Confidence
Level for Difference

Reporting Regime
Monitoring Treatment
Trust Monitoring
Human Monitoring

Self-Report
8.38
12.04

Verified
9.14
8.71

Difference
-0.76
3.33

Std. Error
1.42
1.55

Sig.
0.593
0.035

Lower
-3.59
0.239

Upper
2.06
6.42

Electronic Monitoring

9.04

7.40

1.64

1.50

0.275

-1.34

4.63

Note: This table shows the pairwise comparison of the adjusted means for each reporting regime in each
monitoring treatment. All of the comparisons were related to a planned, specific hypothesis rather than a result of
post hoc comparisons. Consequently, the alpha level was not adjusted for the multiple comparisons. P-values < .05
are bolded.

35

All of the measured outcomes were related to a planned, specific hypothesis rather than a result
of post hoc comparisons. For this reasons, I did not adjust the significance level of the p values for the
planned comparisons. This approach is consistent with guidelines for planned multiple comparisons (Fisher
1947; Rothman 1990).
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CONCLUSION
In this study, I theorized that monitoring could crowd-out an individual’s intrinsic
motivation to be honest. I further theorized that this loss of intrinsic motivation would
change the individual’s attitude toward dishonesty and increase their ability to rationalize
deviant behavior—all leading to a higher propensity toward dishonest behavior. This led
to my hypothesis that, given an opportunity to cheat, dishonesty will be higher in an
environment where monitoring intensity is higher.
To test my hypothesis, I assigned each participant in the experiment to one of
three monitoring environments: trust monitoring, human monitoring, or electronic
monitoring. With this treatment induced, I gave the participants a simple mental math
task with a monetary reward based on performance. Half the participants in each
treatment self-reported their results; while the other half had their results verified (groups
were segregated and unaware of each other). The spread between the average reported
performance of verified and non-verified groups was used a proxy for the incidence of
cheating in each monitoring-treatment group (Ariely et al. 2009).
Dishonesty was not detected in the trust treatment, but cheating was detected in
the human monitored treatment and—to a lesser extent—in the electronically monitored
treatment. Therefore it appears that monitoring does affect the agent’s preference for
honesty. Thus, I find evidence to support of my hypothesis, although questions still
remain as to why cheating was detected in the human monitored treatment at a
statistically significant level, but cheating was not detected at a significant level in the
electronically monitored treatment.
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I offer three explanations for why cheating was higher in the human monitored
treatment than the electronically monitored treatment. First, it is possible that there was a
strong propensity to be dishonest in the electronically monitored treatment, but the
electronic monitoring convinced the participants that the risk of exposure was still present
in this situation. Perhaps they feared they were being recorded, or their movements on the
mental math task were being scrutinized. If so, then it is probable that, even though they
had a high propensity to be dishonest, they thought it better to be honest and not risk
detection. Second, it is possible that the individuals saw the electronic monitoring as a
cue that the task was very important to the monitor, or that the monitor was very
concerned with their work. If individuals viewed the task as being important to someone
then that may have decreased their propensity to be dishonest, even if they disliked the
monitoring. Third, it is possible that the participants did not dislike the electronic
monitoring as much as they disliked the human monitoring, leading to lower propensity
to be dishonest. This explanation would not be consistent with past research and
anecdotal evidence which shows electronic monitoring is more stressful than traditional
human monitoring (Stanton 2000). Future research should be done in this area to
determine the how individuals view different monitoring regimes, and how their views
shape their attitudes towards different work behaviors.
In conclusion, the agency theory literature and fraud prevention literature rarely
consider the negative effects of monitoring on the individual psyche. Usually, only the
principal’s explicit monetary costs are considered when searching for the optimal amount
of monitoring. This study, and others, suggest that there are significant “hidden costs”
(Falk and Kosfeld 2006), and unanticipated effects, of monitoring and control that have
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yet to be fully explored in the business literature. Since these costs and effects are mostly
unknown, business researchers currently lack the ability to predict the effects of controls,
or regulation, on behavior. In contrast, much more is known about other environmental
effects on behavior, such as the effects of incentives on work performance (Bonner et al.
2000), than is known about how individuals react to different types of internal controls.
Following Christ et al. (2012), I believe that future research should further develop our
understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls.
Further developing this line of research may yield important clues to longstanding questions, such as why financial fraud is still persistent despite increases in
regulation and ethics training (Rezaee 2005), why individuals display trustworthy
behavior in certain situations and contractual arrangements but selfish behavior in others
(Rankin et al. 2008), why individuals collude against control systems (Zhang 2008), and
finally, why whistleblowing may be more likely in some environments or situations than
others (Seifert et al. 2013). Using empirical evidence to address the questions will aid in
the design of more effective internal controls (Sprinkle 2003), the development of more
efficient contracts (Brown et al. 2009), and more comprehensive theoretical models for
business researchers (e.g., Tirole 2009)

87

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The standard principal-agent theory of the firm suggests the principal should seek
to control the agent’s behavior (solve the agency problem) though either monitoring the
agent’s performance or aligning the agent’s interest with the owner’s interest through the
use of incentives.36 While there has been a wealth of interesting research on the effects of
incentives on agent behavior (Bonner et al. 2000), less is known about the effects
monitoring and control on the agent. This has led some to call for research that further
develops our understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls (e.g., Christ
et al. 2012). This three paper dissertation heeds this call.
Drawing on past literature, which suggests that agents have a disdain for control
(Falk and Kosfield 2006) and find monitoring stressful (Stanton 2000), I formed
hypotheses about how and why agents may react to various levels of monitoring. In short,
the literature seems to suggest that, when all else is equal, monitoring should increase
external motivation at the expense of internal motivation and reciprocity. This basic
assumption motivated all three studies in this dissertation. The first study in this
dissertation investigates the effects of monitoring intensity on discretionary effort,
volunteer rates for an optional task, and effort spent on an optional task. The second
study investigates the effects monitoring intensity on problem solving ability. The third
study investigates the effects of monitoring intensity on behavioral honesty.

36

In practice, most business arrangements seem to use a mix of incentive pay and monitoring. For
example, Bulow and Summers’s (1986) model of dual labor markets is based on the assumption that if
monitoring is difficult work conditions will be good and pay will be high, while if monitoring is easy,
working conditions will be poor and pay will be low.
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Overall the results from the three studies seem to support the theory that increased
monitoring intensity lowers internal motivation, although the results vary on different
measures across the different types of monitoring environments (human monitoring or
electronic monitoring). For example, in the first study I expected to find that monitoring
intensity would be associated with lower discretionary effort, lower volunteer rates for
optional tasks, and lower effort on optional tasks. While this is assumption was mostly
correct, there does seem to be a more complicated relationship between volunteer rates
for an optional task and monitoring intensity. It seems that in some cases high monitoring
intensity causes volunteer rates for optional tasks to increase, perhaps because of a
perceived loss of autonomy. In study two I expected to find that monitoring intensity
would be associated with lower problem solving ability across all measures. While I
found this to generally be the case, I also found that an individual’s confidence in their
base ability interacted with the monitoring treatment to determine performance on
complex problem solving. 37 In study three I expected to find that, when given the
opportunity to cheat, monitoring intensity would be associated with increased dishonesty.
Again, generally I found this to be case. However, I did find that monitoring at the most
intense levels seems to curtail dishonest behavior.
While the topics in these studies are becoming increasingly important to
researchers and practitioners, most of the ideas, methods, and psychological theories
drawn on this dissertation are novel to the managerial accounting literature. The results of
these experiments are not meant to be directly generalizable outside of a laboratory
setting. Rather, these experiments, and their results, should be considered in the larger
37

These findings are consistent with the theory of social facilitation, which details how individual
subconsciously change their behavior in the presence of others (e.g., Zajonc 1965; Aiello and Douthitt
2001).
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frameworks of organizational theory, human psychology, and current practices. Taken
together, the findings from this dissertation add to our understanding of the effects
organizational controls on agent behavior and abilities. These findings also open up new
research questions and avenues for research.
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Appendix A
Short Demographics Questionnaire

Circle all that apply to you
1) I am: Male Female
2) My age is :

Under 18

18 -24

3) I consider myself mostly an:
Not a student
4) I consider myself mostly:
Not a student

Over 24

International Student

A business student

5) I am a: Freshman/Sophomore
Student
Other

Not a business student

Junior/Senior

6) I like to play sports or enjoy watching sports:

Yes

7) I consider myself good with numbers and mental math:
8) I am in a good mood (happy) today: Yes
9) I am tired today: Yes

American Student

Graduate

No
Yes

No

No

No

Your answers on this form and your performance on the assigned tasks will remain
anonymous and will not be matched to your name, image, person, or consent form
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Appendix B
Electronic Monitoring Workstation with Camera on Computer Tower
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Appendix C
Example of Task Invoice

America's Math and Logic Puzzle Leader

Invoice Due
Invoice #
Invoice Date
Credit Terms

1721 N Germantown Pkwy
Cordova, TN 38016
Phone: 1-800-296-0673
Fax: 1-901-296-0678

77613
12/14/2012
2/15, N/30

Customer
Name:
Street Address:
City and Zip Code:
Item
1
2
3

Tiller Homeschool
116 Craig RD
Ft. Johnson, CO 80055

SKU
61D
16C
33E

DESCRIPTION
Weights and Measures
Power Reading
Audio Books

Price Each
$
5.49
$
4.99
$
12.99

[42]

Quantity
6
9
2

Pre-Tax Total

AMOUNT
32.94
44.91
25.98
$

103.83

OTHER COMMENTS

Sales Tax Rate

1. Total payment due in 30 days
2. Please include the invoice number on your check

6.25%

Total Sales Tax

$

6.49

TOTAL DUE

$

110.32

Make all checks payable to
Education USA Inc.

If you have any questions about this invoice, please contact
Reggie Thomason - Customer Service Specialist - 1-800-296-0673 Ext. 8871

Thank You For Your Business!
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Appendix D
Example of Electronically Entered Data
Invoice #
Sample
77613
77614
77616
77617
77618
77619
77621
77622
77623
77624
77625
77627
77629
77629
77630
77633
77634
77635
77637
77638

Invoice Date
12/13/2012
12/14/2012
12/14/2012
12/15/2012
12/15/2012
12/15/2012
12/15/2012
12/16/2012
12/16/2012
12/17/2012
12/17/2012
12/17/2012
12/17/2012
12/18/2012
12/18/2012
12/18/2022
12/19/2012
12/19/2012
12/19/2012
12/19/2012
12/20/2012

Customer Name
Street Address
Davis Elmentary
3402 Honeycutt Lane
Tiller Homeschool
116 Craig RD
Gradar Academy
21 Shallow Hill
Hoover Baptist
3636 N. Applin St.
Dallas East
303030 Caraway Ave.
Sherry Henson
9911 W. Harrwood St.
Mathnasium of Boston 17454 Hickory Hill Ste. C
Chambers and Sloan
71 Jersey Cir.
Chambers and Sloan
71 Jersey Cir.
Danny Fielder
403 Dr.
Hillcrest Elementary
1324 Cresmont Dr.
Sherman Heights Prep
321 Dover Ave.
Cindy Shultz
112 East Bark St.
Amanda Milligan
245 Lowcust Dr.
Crystal Sullivan
13615 Widover Ave.
Josh Blackburn
203 Park East Circle
Pathways Academy 2123 South Bender Ave.
Pathways Academy 2123 South Bender Ave.
Shae Brewer
6667 South Mendall
Margit Burkhart
901 Metzler Ave.
Justin Newberry
458 Court Lane

City
Salem, AL
Ft. Johntson, CO
Casper, WY
Gary, IN
Dallas, TX
Junction City, SC
Boston, MS
Searcy, AR
Searcy, AR
Batesville, MS
Greenville, LA
Sistern, MA
Oakley, CA
Caraway, AR
Quinten, OK
Bedford, OH
Lafe, KY
Lafe, KY
Carthage, MO
New Haven, NJ
Indianapolis, IN
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Zip Code
35444
80055
82717
46335
77231
29563
02103
72475
74275
38606
70856
05562
90028
72419
73472
44146
42788
42788
63197
08912
47963

Item 1 SKU
72A
61D
11A
31S
80D
07A
63A
11A
31S
39D
3S1
63A
16C
22B
72A
29A
87A
11A
57B
33E
78A

Description 1
Fuzzy Logic Concept
Weights and Measures
Making Cents of Money
Elementary Numerical Basics
Graphing, Charting, and Mapping
Geometry, Shapes, and Spaces
Advanced Logic and Reasoning
Making Cents of Money
Elementary Basics
Plane Trigonometry II
Elementary Numerical Basics
Advances In Logic and Reasoning
Power Reading
Fractions and Algebraic Equations
Fuzzy Logic Concepts
Fundamental Problem Solving
Math Music
Making Cents of Money
Linear Equations and Inequalities
Audio Books
Math Music

Appendix E
One of Three Feedback Forms Used in the Optional Task

Feedback Form 1 – Task 1 - Rating the person who entered the Data
Rate the following statements

1.

The person who entered this

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

No
Opinion































data was careful and precise.
2.

The invoices were bounded in
the folder neatly.

3.

The Excel spread sheet was
neat and easy to read.

4.

I had to fix very few errors.











5.

Most errors were small errors









































such as missing decimals.
6.

There were about the same
amount of errors on every
invoice entered.

7.

The amount of errors per
invoice was about the same at
the beginning of my work as
the end of my work.

8.

I would recommend the person
who entered the data for more
work in this area.
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Appendix F
Water-jar Task Interface
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Appendix G
Water-jar Task Progression Chart and Answer Sheet Form
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Appendix H
Matrix task for testing honesty
9.50
9.37
3.11
4.41

4.92
6.09
0.50
8.11

6.47
8.15
7.54
9.35

6.84
2.38
9.60
1.01

8.99
7.68
8.56
1.76

7.24
6.65
5.47
3.92

6.00
8.83
0.86
4.25

6.23
9.01
4.04
1.42

4.94
7.96
0.99
6.06

0.12
1.71
8.88
9.18

8.07
2.20
9.96
8.92

2.02
3.44
8.29
1.17

6.79
4.06
4.93
3.23

4.15
5.82
4.18
8.56

8.95
4.34
5.18
1.80

3.36
1.57
0.61
8.43

4.20
8.39
1.43
6.97

0.06
3.35
5.29
6.75

0.48
2.42
5.21
9.81

6.40
9.72
2.57
1.64

8.36
6.92
7.65
3.58

1.82
1.10
8.02
2.49

2.44
8.87
1.93
1.97

7.36
3.37
9.16
2.64

6.46
2.02
0.07
3.39

0.89
0.52
3.54
4.80

6.92
0.37
0.45
7.46

7.46
9.97
5.21
9.22

0.78
3.02
0.64
7.87

1.08
1.89
7.27
2.29

1.51
7.19
1.48
2.30

3.64
7.13
7.09
8.18

1.86
4.56
2.96
8.14

1.09
8.82
5.12
6.55

5.74
6.53
7.01
5.63

3.45
6.44
4.31
8.83

0.28
0.14
8.27
8.66

1.71
1.93
9.39
1.12

7.31
9.72
2.48
2.34

7.21
1.10
7.10
5.13

3.24
8.12
7.12
8.90

3.31
9.00
7.75
3.80

7.80
1.34
2.86
6.88

3.12
9.81
4.42
6.44

3.59
2.96
9.31
5.67

4.95
9.02
9.61
2.12

2.10
8.33
5.61
5.52

7.65
2.97
9.61
5.05

2.08
5.02
3.40
6.98

0.28
5.00
4.98
8.61

8.60
3.93
7.44
0.94

7.48
7.11
2.52
2.69

4.98
2.94
9.49
3.86

5.32
6.92
8.57
6.01

3.84
5.48
8.03
6.37

8.22
6.98
1.31
6.59

1.97
5.77
0.92
0.28

9.44
6.93
8.36
0.56

6.71
9.34
6.85
8.89

4.29
1.28
9.28
4.92
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